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
10 February 1983

USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

No. 1366

Selections From Soviet Foreign Policy Journals



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CPSU OFFICIAL LAUDS POST-1971 INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, GANDHI REGIME

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 9, Sep 82 pp 19-22

/Article by R. Ul'yanovskiy, doctor of economics: "The Influential Political Force of India" _/

/Text/ In recent years in the Soviet Union there have been many interesting works published which analyze various aspects of the socio-economic development of independent India. However, the role of the nation's ruling party, the Indian National Congress (INC), which has continuously held power for 30 years, and its place in the nation's political system requires special study. Interest in this subject is justified, for we are talking about a period of great political changes in India, one of the largest nations in Asia.

The 1950's, essentially the first decade of independence, were the period of the Congress Party's most firm and stable position as the ruling party at the center and locally. This situation (although it gradually changed, and not to the favor of the Congress Party) was maintained until the middle of the 1960's. Using somewhat arbitrary dates, one can state that it remained generally unchanged until the death of J. Nehru. In the second half of the 1960's serious crisis phenomenon began to be observed in the Congress Party, which led to an internal split in the party and latter to its loss of power in many states.

In the beginning of the 1970's it was possible to show that the crisis in the Congress Party had been overcome. However, subsequent events, the sharpening of the political situation in the nation in the middle of the decade, the introduction of the emergency laws, the unification of the opposition forces in the struggle against I. Gandhi's government, and the Congress Party's temporary loss of power all prove that the crisis in the party was a deep and important phenomenon. The fall of the Gandhi government in 1977 led to important changes in the nation's party and political system. Although the "Janata" coalition did not hold power very long, and in the 1980 elections Indira Gandhi won a very convincing victory, the shifts and changes at the end of the 1970's could not and did not disappear without a trace. The Congress Party is again in power, but it is no longer the same Congress Party, and it is operating under different conditions than before. A new stage has begun in the history of the Congress Party's development. This stage is still too new to provide the basis for any definitive conclusions. For just this reason the previous period in the

Congress Party's development acquires some significance, casting light upon the events of our day. It is risky to make predictions about the future, but there can be no doubt that the end of the 1970's, or to be more exact, the second half of the 1960's and the 1970's turned out to be a turning point in India's political development.

It is generally known that among the liberated nations, former colonies and semi-colonies which achieved independence after the Second World War, India is a unique case in the sense that its independent political structure after 1947 was based upon the canons of bourgeois constitutionalism and parliamentarianism, primarily the British model. In its organization there is also a marked influence of the constitutional system of the United States in the areas of federalism and the right of the supreme court to review.

Bourgeois political scientists have called India "the largest democracy in the world" (according to the number of voters). It is true that all the attributes of bourgeois democracy have been widely applied in India. However, it would be incorrect to assume that this so-called model of democracy was transplanted, or could be transplanted to Indian soil without substantial changes. The conditions were too different, one can say fundamentally different. Such a great expert and analyst of political systems and political history as Jawaharlal Nehru, being indisputably the inspirer of fundamental principles in India's constitution, could not help but recognize this. The most indicative and socially significant thing about this constitution is not that it copies European models, but that it fills them with new content, ensuring the political stability for state power in India for 30 years under conditions unprecedented, unknown, and unsuitable to classical bourgeois democracy. This is a most noteworthy phenomenon.

This filling of bourgeois democracy's classical principles with new content is especially evident in the structure of political power. At the moment of its birth it was, and to this day independent India remains one of the most, if not the most multiparty state in the world. Concurrently, this multiparty condition, being sort of a symbol of the faith of bourgeois democracy's adherents, is an imaginary freedom. In the course of 30 years it has not only not led to a replacement of the sole ruling party at the center, but it has not been able to give rise to an opposition capable of making a real claim to power. The classical bourgeois multiparty (or its variant, the two party) system is characterized by a periodic "changing of the guard". In India the system of political power has quite reliably supported the stable leadership of the nation by the Congress Party.

When such a situation began to arise in certain other developing nations, a phrase defining this phenomena appeared among political scientists: A multiparty system with a dominating party. In this field India was probably a pioneer.

The Indian Constitution provided the ruling party with a well developed mechanism for retaining and consolidating power. It is sufficient to point to

the institution of presidential rule in the states (Article 356 of the constitution), which was first put into effect under J. Nehru to remove the government in Kerala, which had legally been formed by the Indian Communists on the basis of election results. However, this matter does not only involve constitutionally available methods for protecting existing power. A really stable power, if it strives to protect and consolidate itself, cannot be based only upon force. The totality of social and economic conditions -- the masses' level of consciousness, official propaganda, the historical traditions of the national liberation struggle, the all-powerful habit of the masses' blind following of society's top political elite and the economic masters -- ensured a real solid support for the Congress Party by the masses of voters.

The Congress Party came to power as the recognized leader of the anti-imperialist and anti-British movement, for decades the main component of all national life. The Congress Party had a powerful and well developed organization throughout the entire country, closely linked to the population and prepared to take power through a prolonged political struggle. It also had experience in self administration in colonial times, although this was essentially formal. However, to people capable of deep analytical thinking and prediction, the changes in the party's situation after its arrival to power became clear comparatively quickly. This applies first of all to its better leaders: Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Both of them noted, one should say, agonizingly experienced the moral and political degeneration of some of their comrades in arms, who, over the years, were gradually transformed from sincere, selfless fighters for the national cause into bureaucrats and nouveau riche engaged only in money grubbing and personal enrichment. The rank and file Indian voter needed much more time before such changes, in the final account flowing from capitalist socio-economic development and encompassing all of India, were recognized and entered into his political consciousness. In some cases disillusionment with the activities of Congress Party members led to loss of faith in the party. The belief of the masses in the Congress Party, especially the peasants and various petty bourgeois strata among the urban population was gradually undermined. In the final account it was they, the multimillion membered strata of India, and especially rural India, who determined all election campaigns.

Undoubtedly, however, the problem was more than the force of tradition. The moral and political changes of some leaders and many rank and file members of the Congress Party occurred more rapidly and markedly outdistanced the changes in this organization's political line. With respect to its class content the Congress Party was always an organization of the Indian national bourgeoisie. However, beginning in 1920 when in the party and in India as a whole began the era marked by the anti-imperialist activities of M. Gandhi, who boldly revolutionized the party's ideology and methods of mass work, the party's social base began to change rapidly. A powerful stream of industrial workers, peasants, masses of unfortunate people, paupers and coolies, urban intelligentsia and small merchants entered it. As a result, left groups arose in the Congress Party, attempting to advocate the ideals of the lower groups. In the 1930's they put forward the question of collective membership of leading trade unions and peasant organizations. The struggle for national independence was a goal for the entire people and in advocating it, the Congress Party was advocating the interests of the entire Indian people.

In the years of the independence struggle the Indian National Congress had the nature of a unique national front, a general national coalition, the ideology, politics, and tactics of which were dominated by the interests of the national bourgeois and sometimes the national liberal forces. The basis of the coalition was the prolonged and real coincidence of interests of practically all classes of Indian society (with the exception of the princes, feudal landlords and compradores completely dependent upon British colonialism) in the struggle for freedom and independence and the assertion of national sovereignty. This gave the Congress Party the possibility of having a strong influence over tens and hundreds of millions of people. This same circumstance also gave rise to its substantial weaknesses, for on a political, ideological, and social level the Congress Party was and remains a very heterogeneous and quite friable organization.

The face of the Congress Party could not automatically change with the winning of independence, although the revolutionary potential of sizable strata of the nation were to a certain extent exhausted. The party retained its heterogeneity and, as previously, was the representative of various political and class currents.

A number of circumstances supported the existence of these diverse forces within the framework of the Indian National Congress.

The nation faced the huge tasks of a general democratic transformation which would correspond to the interests of all classes, with the exception of feudal and compradore classes. As Nehru understood perfectly well, political independence could turn out to be fictional if it were not reinforced by economic independence, if the nation were not liberated from imperialism's economic exploitation. From thence followed the necessity of industrialization, the creation of a powerful state sector as a base for social and economic progress. All these goals were outlined in the so-called "Nehru Course". The categorical necessity of Indian society's technical-economic and socio-cultural reorganization required a consistent peace loving foreign policy, and an anticolonialist, antiracist, and anti-imperialist course. This course permitted, and still permits Indian politics to retain its progressive content.

The Congress Party's diversity was expressed in its platform. It had an eclectic, compromised, and contradictory nature, attempting to include and tie together the interests of very diverse strata of the population. The Congress Party's ideology did not coincide with its real bourgeois politics. It was wider and deeper than these politics and intended for the nation's vast masses. Serving as a means of bourgeois politics, the ideology of the Congress Party at the same time transcended the framework of narrow class interests of the bourgeoisie. These tendencies, noted in the Congress Party back in the 1930's, found expression in J. Nehru's proclamation at the session of the Indian National Congress in Avadi in January 1955 of the goal of transforming society to a socialist model. It was necessary to use special ideological and tactical methods such as the thesis on the priority of economic growth prior to solving social contradictions in order to justify essentially bourgeois policies with socialist slogans.

The Congress Party related to these slogans in various ways. Some tolerated them as a propaganda device for ensuring the confidence of the masses, well aware of the fact that in the second half of the 20th Century capitalism could not advance in India under its own flag, that it needed to disguise itself. Others took the socialist slogans seriously and wanted to fill them with real content. The contradictory ideological platform created the soil for the simultaneous coexistence and struggle of different political forces within the framework of the Congress Party.

Finally, another quite important factor supporting the existence of contradictory tendencies in the party and ensuring its retention of power was the fact that this organization was led by the nation's acknowledged leaders, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, men with a wide range of views and tolerance, not binding themselves to any group. In spite of deep differences in their views, both of them, Gandhi and Nehru, were convinced adherents of unity of the entire multinational people and of the integrity of the Indian state. They made the greatest contribution to the solution of these problems, which, in spite of the class narrowness of their ideas about national and social unity, turned out to be historically justified both in the years of struggle for freedom, and in the first decades of independent India. The Indian national capitalist class would not have made use of Gandhi or Nehru if they had not met its interests. However, neither Gandhi nor Nehru were henchmen of the Indian money-bags, nor were they agents of their will. They were the nation's leaders in the full and better sense of the word. They were able to go beyond the bounds of the self-interest of bourgeois politics, and were filled with a burning sensitivity for the working masses.

In M. Gandhi these tendencies found embodiment in his idea of sarvodaya, a patriarchal, peasant idyl where all people are brothers, where everybody works, and where there is no parasitism, exploitation, or inequality. Mahatma Gandhi cherished the dream of approaching this society by nonviolent means. All his life he remained true to this conviction.

The path of Nehru's ideological and political development was somewhat more complex. Having begun, in his own words, "with one hundred percent nationalism" influenced by the defeat of the nationalist movement led by Gandhi, he concluded that it was limited. At the end of the 1920's and the beginning of the 1930's this led Nehru to a position of revolutionary democracy strongly influenced by scientific socialism. However, the troubled struggle between the party's rights and lefts in the 1930's convinced him of the obstinacy of the rights in their attempts to crush the lefts and their readiness to move into a splinter group for this purpose. Not immediately, nor all at once, but little by little, Nehru was forced to sacrifice his revolutionary democratism to the unity of the Indian National Congress. The concepts of socialism and revolutionary mindedness began to weaken in his political statements, and when Nehru became prime minister they were gradually replaced by a left national reformism, which naturally had a Gandhi coloration.

It is difficult to say what had the greater influence upon this evolution of Nehru's views: His own convictions, or the necessity of starting from the level of consciousness in the party of which he was the leader. Nehru clearly

understood that in the 1950's this party could not accept his revolutionary views of the first half of the 1930's. Not without foundation, Nehru felt that the stage of the socialist revolution had not yet arrived in India, and that the nation required a transitional period. This was correct and did not contradict his concepts of the 1930's. However, in contrast to the 1930's he argued for this transitional period now on a nationalist-reformist level rather than a revolutionary one. It was reformist ideas that he propagandized, having become prime minister, and it was just such ideas which imbued the conception of "society in a socialist image". Through all this Nehru did not burn his bridges linking him with his revolutionary past. He retained a deep belief in the ideals of genuine socialism and was aware of the bourgeois character of the politics carried out by the Congress Party under socialist slogans.

Such were the two figures who, through their skill, ensuring unity of the Congress Party and its support by the masses, not breaking with the national capitalist class were able to go beyond the framework of bourgeois ideas about politics. In India there has never been, not even up until now, a force able to shake the authority of these names and the somewhat instinctive faith of the masses in everything connected to them.

For a long time these principles ensured the Congress Party's unity and its broad support by diverse social forces. They thus defended the party's monopoly of power in a multiparty system without turning to repression on such a scale as to cast doubt upon the state's bourgeois democratic character.

However, nothing is eternal in the political world. The effect of all these factors was slowly undermined by the development of capitalism, the sharpening of class contradictions, and the ever greater predominance of bourgeois class egoism over general national interests in the policies of the ruling party, especially on the level of state and local power. The departure of the party's charismatic leaders from the political arena assisted this considerably.

While formally following the "Nehru Course" bourgeois elements limited the effectiveness of his envisaged general democratic transformations, and his orientation towards the masses. They injected inconsistency, class self-interest, and elitist narrowness into his conceptions. The ruling party began to increasingly turn to force to suppress the most critical class actions of workers. The ideological umbrella of Gandhism and the "Nehru Course", which had covered diverse elements in the Congress Party, could no longer protect everybody. The rightist circles of the national capitalist class more clearly revealed an aspiration towards an openly conducted consistent bourgeois policy to the benefit of only the large capitalists in the cities and the large capitalist landlords and rich peasants in the countryside. The rightists also wanted to reject the "Nehru Course" with its socialist ideals and principles of centralized planning with a strong state sector, in which monopolistic Indian capitalists increasingly felt a threat to their own freedom and obstacle free growth.

The fourth general elections in 1967 became a major watershed in India's political development. There was a serious weakening of the Congress Party's position in the center and non-Congress Party governments were formed in seven states. This undermined the basis of Congress Party domination and gave an impetus to change the nation's existing party and political system.

The ensuing events are well known. The negative election results for the Congress Party and the disputes within the party leadership on the reasons for the failure and the measures necessary to eliminate them became an obvious indicator of a split in the party. The expulsion of the "Syndicate", a rightist grouping, from the Congress Party, and somewhat of an intensification of democratic tendencies in the party did not free the Congress Party from the significant influence of conservative forces remaining at the leadership level. Influential groups of the national bourgeoisie, including the monopolists, continued to give financial and other support to the Congress Party, doing this with definite calculations in mind.

Although the results of the general elections of 1971, the Congress Party's victory over the forces of the united right opposition --the "great alliance"-- in outward appearances would seem to have returned the Congress Party to a position of domination as in the 1950's and beginning of the 1960's, in fact the accumulation of objective and subjective factors in the break up of the party's dominant position continued very intensively. The events of 1973-1975 gave new impulse to the movement towards unification of the oppositional forces, and the crisis of the Congress Party became even sharper.

The state of emergency during 1975-1977 caused wide discussion in the foreign and Soviet press. The reasons for its introduction and the character of the measures announced by the I. Gandhi government, including those for the implementation of the progressive government "Twenty Point Program", are known. However, they were too late. The lower strata of the public had rejected the Congress Party. The negative results to the party from all the measures it introduced during the state of emergency are evidence that the ruling party did not succeed in overcoming the objective and subjective factors which caused the crisis in its power. In 1977 the party suffered a defeat.

What are the reasons for the Congress Party's disintegration and loss of authority, which led it to defeat in 1977? If one looks for these reasons not in the concrete historical situation of the second half of the 1970's, but in the profound social processes, there can be no doubt about the answer. It was the growing difficulties and contradictions of capitalist development in India, heavily telling upon the masses. The Congress Party had the good intentions of easing these difficulties, developing national capitalism within the framework of general national interests, organically subordinating it to the goals of economic development and social welfare, preventing the rapid growth of monopolies and on this basis lessening class conflict. These all turned out to be illusory. Contradictions also continued to increase within the ruling class, between its right, center, and left circles, and between the national bourgeoisie and the broad masses. Workers' demonstrations assumed unprecedented scales. In 1973 Indira Gandhi stated: "We acutely feel the growing impatience of our people. We understand that if our system cannot satisfy the valid expectations of the people, then they might prefer other methods." This is just what happened.

However, the "Janata" coalition, which replaced the Congress Party, could not offer the Indian people a satisfactory alternative for national development. The "Janata" concentrated on criticism of the Congress Party regime and system

trying to fully utilize public dissatisfaction for its own interests. However, it was not able to develop an effective and dynamic program of action. Very soon its random and sometimes even unprincipled character led the "Janata" coalition to a breakup. It took only 30 months to exhaust the voters' faith.

Part of the Indian National Congress, which after the elections of 1977 followed Indira Gandhi in spite of a serious defeat, remained a potent political force that continued to receive the support of broad strata of the rural and urban population and considerable groups of the property owning classes. The disintegration and ignominious collapse of "Janata" and its communalistic and chauvinistic ideals led the Indian National Congress under the leadership of Indira Gandhi to a convincing victory in the parliamentary elections of 1980. The party again gained power and began to live like a ruling party in a great Asian country. It again gained the faith of the people and what is especially important -- of the lower strata.

The arrival of the party to power and its predominance over the opposition poses the question as to whether or not the nation's party and political system has again returned to the situation of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's. It is necessary, however, to take into consideration the fact that the entire structure of bourgeois political power in the nation has changed markedly due to new socio-economic and political phenomena. The change in ruling parties in the center, the growing influence of the opposition, and the experience with coalition government not only in the center, but in many states all fundamentally distinguish the situation in the beginning of the 1980's from that of the first three decades of independence.

At the same time, the formation of the elements of a classical multiparty bourgeois political structure, towards which some strata of the national bourgeoisie, liberal landlords and capitalists, and the growing wealthy peasantry were striving, was still only in its first stages, and experiencing the influence of quite profound factors. These factors involved both the necessity of immediately solving the complex socio-economic problems facing the country, and the increasingly sharp struggle of different and at times contradictory political forces over the way of solving the cardinal problems of development.

The rightist reactionary forces are, of course, a dangerous alternative to Congress Party power at the national level. It is the main danger, and it is increasingly on the political horizon. The Indian National Congress, led by I. Gandhi is struggling against this as a broad organization with relative historical progressiveness. It uses this to maintain its popularity and deserved authority.

Leaders always play an important role in a political struggle. In India, as a classical nation of the East, this is especially important for the leader is a symbol of mass consciousness, a stable national instinct, personal faith and even respect. Here, in the eyes of the rank and file voters any, even the most progressive, political course does not exist on its own, but is associated with a definite personality. For 35 years no opposition force in India has been able to put forward a great figure of general national importance.

The Congress Party is another matter. Its prestige has been and continues to be to a huge extent determined by the fact that it was the party of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Even today the Congress remains a party grouped around a leader. This became completely obvious when in the course of several schisms in recent years the overwhelming majority of Indian voters gave their preference to those who followed Indira Gandhi, giving to them a considerable share of the support which they never gave to the Congress Party alone. Indira Gandhi is to a huge extent helped by the fact that she is the daughter of J. Nehru. However, her own qualities as a gifted state figure in Asia, her dynamism, energy, and decisiveness, will power, as well as ability to in touch with the masses both in times of celebration and of troubles and to arouse their sympathy have all helped maintain her influence. In this sense the Congress Party continues to have definite advantages arising above all from the general nationalist, anti-imperialist, and peace loving aspirations of the Indian people.

Various judgements can be made with respect to the prospects for Indian political developments. Many observers do not exclude the intensification of tendencies towards the concentration of power in the hands of one individual. Influential circles of the national capitalist class are quite definitely striving for this. Suggestions have repeatedly been made about changing the constitution and attempts have even been made to organize political movements around them. Will the Congress Party resort to such methods of maintaining power, or will it remain true to the democratic institutions established by J. Nehru? It appears that this latter case is the most favorable for democratic circles. The Congress Party has no genuine reserves for maintaining its authority other than turning to Nehru's socialist ideals and striving to fill them with real content through a policy of social progress in the interests of the Indian working people -- the majority.

One thing cannot be doubted: Any development alternative will proceed from an intense political struggle and to a considerable extent will depend upon a mass movement, upon the activities of the nation's left, democratic and progressive forces.

While not attempting to predetermine this struggle's results in the immediate future, one can, however, still make a few observations.

For many years India has suffered from a fragmented democratic movement, from its inability to achieve mutual understanding and develop a unified program of action on a national level. This is widely used by the forces of the right, skillfully exploiting all the favorable opportunities created by the numerous vestiges of the middle ages in Indian life.

This is why the liquidation of the fragmentation in the democratic movement and the forces of social progress, and the unification of their joint efforts, operating in one direction, against the danger on the right, is objectively growing into the most important problem in the further development and renewal of life in India's society.

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IAEA WORK ON NONPROLIFERATION, PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ENERGY EVALUATED

Moscow MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN' in Russian No 12, Dec 82 pp 113-115

[Article by V. Misharin: "For the Peaceful use of Atomic Energy (On the Results of the XXVI Session of the IAEA General Conference)"]

[Text] Not long ago in Vienna the 26th session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), which coincided with the 25th Anniversary of that organization, completed its work. Delegates from 90 nations, including the USSR, Ukrainian SSR, and Belorussian SSR, participated.

The entire history of the IAEA is an example of the successful cooperation of states with different social orders in the strengthening of the international regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Today the IAEA is a recognized international organ which coordinates the efforts of states in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As L. I. Brezhnev stressed in a message addressed to the session's participants: "For the quarter century of its existence, this authoritative international organization has achieved significant successes. The widest recognition has been given to the IAEA for its multifaceted efforts directed at the prevention of the scattering of nuclear weapons around our planet, and at putting a reliable barrier in the way of the appearance of these most dangerous weapons of mass destruction in the hands of those forces which would want to threaten people with them."

The international nonproliferation regime, the basis of which is the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, assists in maintaining the stability of contemporary international relations. It also helps in the development of international cooperation in the peaceful applications of the atom's energy.

The IAEA General Conference's session convincingly demonstrated that the agency is not standing on the sidelines of the most important political events in the contemporary world. The peaceful initiatives put forward recently by the Soviet Union received support by the session. It noted the importance of the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe, ratified by the 36 Session of the UN General Assembly at the initiative of the USSR.

Our nation's unilateral renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons was valued as an important step forward. Great attention was also given to other Soviet suggestions, above all on problems of further strengthening the

nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, put forward at the UN General Assembly's Second Special Session on Disarmament in a memorandum of the USSR: "Stop the Growing Nuclear Threat, Control the Arms Race".

The new initiatives of the Soviet Union at the General Assembly's 37th Session, in particular the "Basic Statutes of a Treaty on the Complete and Universal Ban on the Testing of Nuclear Weapons", and the suggestion to include as an urgent question in this session's agenda that: "Efforts be increased to eliminate the threat of nuclear war and ensure the safe development of nuclear power engineering", also had a considerable positive influence on the work of the agency session. These initiatives, having as their goal the reduction of the nuclear danger, are consonant with the IAEA's efforts in this direction.

As the session showed, many states are advocating a further increase in the IAEA's role in ensuring the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The world now widely acknowledges the importance of the agency's activities, above all in the area of control, or as is still said, guarantees with regard to the utilization of nuclear materials and equipment. This is due to the completely understandable desire of states to prevent a situation in which a material and technical base created in the process of nuclear power engineering development in non-nuclear nations might be converted to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

IAEA verification, exercised in accordance with the agency charter, the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, and a series of other international agreements, occupies a central role in all the agency's activities involving the prevention of the appearance of new states possessing nuclear weapons.

At the session the delegates in general gave a very high evaluation of the IAEA's activities in the area of verification. It supervises about 98% of the nuclear installations and the overwhelming share of nuclear materials in states not possessing nuclear weapons. One should note that the IAEA exercises this supervision with complete observation of states' sovereign rights. Such supervision does not create difficulties for states' economic or scientific and technical activities or for international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. On the contrary, the agency's effective supervision gives the world community the confidence that the conditions necessary for the continuation and expansion of such cooperation are being ensured.

The readiness of the USSR to, as an act of good will, put under agency guarantee part of its peaceful nuclear installations -- several nuclear power stations and research reactor -- was met with proper appreciation in IAEA circles. In the opinion of authoritative specialists such a step leads to further improvements in the IAEA's authority, and strengthens confidence in the system of agency guarantees. There was also a positive perception of the Soviet Union's readiness to, in the near future, enter into negotiations with IAEA with the goal of concluding the appropriate agreements on guarantees.

Ever greater significance is now being given throughout the world to other directions of IAEA's activity to one degree or another involved with ensuring the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, especially in view of the further

development of ties between states involving the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. For several years at the agency work has been under way in the development of ideas for international or regional centers for the nuclear fuel cycle, in particular an international regime for the storage of plutonium and spent nuclear fuel. An international system of guaranteed nuclear deliveries is being developed in a specially created committee. The IAEA is actively participating in preparations for a UN Conference on assisting international cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which will be held in Geneva in 1983.

The question of Israel's participation in the agency's activities had a major place in the work of the IAEA General Conference's Session. Israel's bandit attack on the Iraqi nuclear center in the summer of 1981, and its refusal to comply with the resolution of the UN Security Council, which condemned this attack, were properly regarded as an open violation of the IAEA Charter. The question of suspending Israel's rights and privileges as an Agency member was brought up before the session. The West's opposition and the lack of the necessary unity among developing nations made it impossible to make a decision on this question.

The majority of states which are IAEA members, with the exception of the United States and its closest allies, spoke out decisively for the nonrecognition of the authority of Israel's representative to the General Conference Session. As a result of this a decision was made not to recognize the authority of the Israeli delegation. This decision, essentially the first in the practice of international intergovernmental organizations, was a great moral and political defeat for Israel and those states which stand behind it. The speeches of the majority of member states' representatives pointed to the actions of Israel in Lebanon as the most gross violation of the norms of international law, an act of naked aggression and genocide. Delegates from many nations spoke in support of a program for the peaceful settlement of the situation in the Middle East, put forward by the Soviet Union.

Considerable attention at the General Conference was given to problems of IAEA activity in assisting the peaceful use of nuclear energy in member states. It was stressed that the agency is conducting extensive work directed towards further expanding the use of nuclear energy for constructive purposes, in the interests of economic and social development of nations, and in improving people's welfare. During the years of its existence the amount of technical assistance that the agency has rendered to member states has grown many fold and in 1981 amounted to 50 million dollars.

The IAEA also assists member states in another important area: the solution of problems in radiation safety and environmental protection. This is a complex problem which requires the joint efforts of many nations. The agency is conducting extensive work to develop standards and norms for radiation safety. IAEA assistance has, to a considerable extent, resulted in the widespread worldwide use of these standards and norms.

The General Conference placed high value upon the IAEA's major contribution to the training of key personnel in nuclear power engineering and other areas of the peaceful use of nuclear energy by member states.

The results of the 26th Session of the IAEA's General Conference, which to a certain extent summed up the results of this international organization's activity over a quarter of a century of its existence, are evidence of the agency having a generally positive position in these very important contemporary problems. The session ratified a report on the activities of the IAEA's activities in 1981. The report reflected the agency's achievements in all the important areas of its activity. This report was sent to the UN General Assembly's 37th Session for examination.

The Soviet Union advocates a further increase in the IAEA's role in the modern world. In view of the growing threat of nuclear war the agency should make a ponderable contribution to the elimination of a nuclear catastrophe. It should use all its authority and all available possibilities for these purposes. Nuclear energy should serve people and not be a means for the annihilation of life.

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HIGHER MILITARY SPENDING DRAG ON ECONOMIC GROWTH OF WESTERN NATIONS

Moscow MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN' in Russian No 8, Aug 82 pp 108-117

[Article by V. Konobeyev: "The Capitalist Economy and the Arms Race"]

[Excerpt] The arms race being speeded up by the U.S. and NATO, is, as a manifestation of the intensified militarization of both the internal and external policies of the imperial powers, being called upon to create the material basis for U.S. claims to world supremacy. It simultaneously pursues another goal -- and the leaders do not hide this -- that of "wearing out" the Soviet Union, and bleeding the economies of the nations in the socialist community. However, those who determine current Western policies frequently lose their sense of reality. The relapse into imperial ambitions causes them to have clearly exaggerated ideas about the potentials of the capitalist economic system, and to have a tendency to underestimate world socialism's potentials. These circles are trying not to notice that the arms race aggravates capitalism's economic illnesses and sharpens crisis phenomena in the West.

Absorbing huge resources (about 600 billion dollars a year) the arms race retards the economic development of even the most industrially strong capitalist nations and places a heavy burden upon the workers' shoulders. Militarist propaganda attempts to pass over this fact in silence or present it in a distorted form, trying to suggest to the public that huge military expenditures are, they say, good for the economy, a source of additional jobs and increased welfare. However, as was noted in the speech to the UN General Assembly's Second Special Session on Disarmament by USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko "no economist has the power to prove that militarization can solve such acute social and economic problems of states as unemployment, inflation, and increased taxes".

Let us turn now to facts and figures in order to examine some economic aspects of the arms race and, the mechanisms for urging it forward, and also its influence on the Western economies.

During 1979-1981 American newspapers and magazines published a whole series of articles, the authors of which sounded the alarm over the "insufficiency" of military expenditures in the U.S. and in the NATO bloc as a whole, over the "weakness" of the American arms industry, its great dependence upon the imports of certain types of raw materials, the shortage of qualified workers (and this

with an army of unemployed of almost 10 million!), inadequate combat readiness of the armed forces, etc. In the final account all these laments were in pursuit of one goal: the justification to society of the unprecedented peacetime increase in military expenditures. Here are some examples.

In one of the articles, former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors under Nixon, McCracken complains that not since 1948 has the U.S. allocated so little to defense as in the recent period and assures American readers that the increase in military expenditures to 8.6% of GNP (the average figure for 1957-1965) by 1985 will not represent too heavy a burden to the American economy.¹ It would be appropriate to make this more precise: by 1985, when, according to American forecasts, GNP should grow to \$4.3 trillion, military expenditures would amount to almost \$370 billion, that is \$1,700 per capita, or \$5,660 per American family.² It is doubtful that many Americans would agree with McCracken's opinion as to the burden free nature of the arms race.

Or take, for example, the magazine BUSINESS WEEK, which published an article estimating the influence of military expenditure increases on economic indicators.³ It asserts that additional military expenditures during 1981 and 1982 will lower unemployment, and increase the rate of economic growth and the volume of new capital investments. However, it compares greater or lesser amounts of military expenditures, instead of comparing the results of using a certain amount of resources for military purposes with their use for civilian purposes. As many scholars' studies show, the use of resources allocated for military purposes in the civilian sector has a considerably greater effect on basic indicators, to say nothing of the fact that it supports the production of socially useful goods and services, and not means of destruction.

The myth of the supposed beneficial influences of the arms race on the economy has long been supported by the military industrial complexes of Western lands. Back in 1957, the president of the American military corporation General Dynamics, F. Pace, who had formerly occupied the post of Secretary of the Army, asserted that military expenditures in American society are a stimulus to economic growth.⁴ Former deputy assistant to the Secretary of Defense J. Gensler announced roughly the same truth 20 years later, with reference to data from the Brookings Institution.⁵

In recent years, when open propaganda for the arms race became too unpopular, apologists of the military industrial complex have conducted it in a more refined and veiled manner. For example, J. Dium, professor at Columbia University, notes that every time there is talk of closing a military base or cancelling a military contract, there are figures showing the number of people who will be laid off. It is not surprising, says Dium, that as a result of such psychological "treatment", many Americans associate a large military budget with a healthy economy. Without this the military would have a hard time showing the necessity of such high military expenditures.⁶

Here is a characteristic example. In the second half of 1977 in connection with the "freezing" of the program for the production of the new B-1 strategic bomber, the organs of the American press began to overflow with sentimental

reports on the difficulties awaiting several thousand people laid off from Rockwell International. The enterprise itself was described as the scene of a natural calamity. However, not one word was mentioned of the fact that the transfer of the resources freed from the B-1 to civilian programs would yield 50 to 100% more jobs. It is understandable though, for then it would have to be admitted that the stepped up arms expenditures under way in the NATO nations would not only fail to increase the employment rate, but would promote the growth of unemployment.

This can be supported by studies showing that the growth of military budgets in the U.S. is, as a rule, accompanied by increases in unemployment. From 1948 to 1950 military expenditures in the nation increased by almost 32% and the unemployment rate increased from 3.8% to 5.3%; during 1956-1958 military expenditures jumped by 14%, and unemployment grew from 4.2% to 6.8%; from 1972 to 1975 military expenditures rose by 20% and unemployment went from 5.6% to 8.5%. Even the 63% increase in military expenditures during 1977-1980 did not provide the American economy with a cure for this chronic disease, during this period unemployment increased from 7% to 9%. In the 1981 fiscal year military expenditures increased by almost 20%, while the number of unemployed topped 9 million.⁸

Exorbitantly swollen military budgets have an equally negative effect upon the inflationary process and other socio-economic processes in Western nations.

The weight of the arms race burden becomes especially vivid when one examines concretely the basic categories of absorbed resources and estimates their magnitude.

Military budgets in the leading NATO nations pump vast financial resources from the economies. During the 1970's these budgets constantly grew, and in 1980 the total military expenditures of the bloc's nations exceeded \$256 billion, compared to \$18.7 billion in 1949, that is a 14 fold increase. The U.S. has always been the leader here, its share in recent years has been about two-thirds of all such NATO expenditures. In the current fiscal year (beginning 1 October 1981) military allocations total around \$220 billion and in 1983 they will grow to \$263 billion,⁹ which is a peacetime record for the nation's entire history. For comparison it can be noted that the GNP of all the nations of Africa, taken together, was less than this sum in 1978 (\$245 billion).¹⁰

The present administration in the U.S., demonstrating the growing aggressiveness of U.S. imperialism, "promises" its fellow citizens and taxpayers to increase the Pentagon's budget over the next five years at even higher rates, so that during the 1982-1986 fiscal years they will have to pull no less than \$1.5-1.6 trillion out of their pockets. "Showing an example" the U.S. ruling circles are simultaneously exerting constant pressure on their partners in the NATO bloc, demanding that they not relax military preparations, but increase their military budgets. In addition, the Americans expect that by forcing their partners to sharply increase military expenditures, they will thereby slow down their economic development and weaken their competitiveness on the world, and also the American market. In addition, the more their allies allocate for arms purchases, the better for the U.S., because these weapons will be primarily supplied by American military industrial corporations.

Table 1. Dynamics of Military Expenditures in the NATO Bloc.
(In billions of Dollars)

Region	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
European Nations of NATO	<u>55.4</u> 37.1	<u>55.9</u> 37.1	<u>62.9</u> 37.5	<u>76.7</u> 40.4	<u>92.2</u> 42.2	<u>107.6</u> 42.0
North America (U.S. and Canada)	<u>94.0</u> 62.9	<u>94.7</u> 62.9	<u>104.8</u> 62.5	<u>113.3</u> 59.6	<u>126.4</u> 57.8	<u>148.6</u> 58.0
NATO, total	<u>149.4</u> 100.0	<u>150.6</u> 100.0	<u>167.7</u> 100.0	<u>190.0</u> 100.0	<u>218.6</u> 100.0	<u>256.2</u> 100.0

Source: "NATO's Fifteen Nations", 1981, December/ 1982, January, p. 94.

Note: In the denominators are the proportions of total, in percent. These data do not coincide with the total national military budgets, since not all sections of the latter are evaluated as contributions to the defense of the bloc.

Another consequence of the arms race is the sterilization of material and technological resources going to military purposes, for they do not participate in the creation of socially useful products, and are excluded from the process of reproduction. The military departments in the main NATO nations possess huge material resources. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense has accumulated in its hands various types of property for military purposes totalling almost \$450 billion, when considered at face value.¹¹

The scale of material and technological resources diverted in the U.S. to military purposes can be indirectly judged by the volume of military procurements. Contracts for goods and services concluded by the Pentagon with private firms in the fiscal year 1981 amounted to more than \$97 billion.¹² Many thousands of industrial firms in various sectors were involved in deliveries under these contracts.

Great Britain, the FRG, France, and Italy also have large military industries. The production volume of some types of armaments clearly exceeds their own armed forces' requirements. The entire "surplus", and it frequently reaches up to 50% of total output, is sold abroad. Thus, together with their senior partner, they urge on the arms race in the developing nations. Although the export of arms yields definite benefits to the Western states, it cannot compensate for the economically negative effects of large military expenditures, as witnessed by the growth in unemployment and inflation in NATO nations, taking place simultaneously with increased military budgets.

The Western nations' economies are considerably hindered by the military consumption of nonrenewable energy and mineral resources. The exhaustion of the reserves of many types of minerals, which is now becoming known, can, in the long run become an even more acute problem for humanity. In the U.S. the military

consumption of aluminum, copper, lead, and zinc during the 1970's averaged 11-14% of the nation's total consumption. A considerable share of the petroleum products consumed by the nation went to satisfy the Pentagon's needs.

The utilization of scientific and technical achievements in the interests of the armaments race leads to the waste of extensive scientific and technological resources to the detriment of economic development in the nations involved. Military R&D work is especially great in the U.S., having sharply increased in the beginning of the 1960's. In the initial postwar years, expenditures for these purposes were comparatively low, \$500 - 800 million, or 3-4% of the Defense Department's budget. However, by the end of the 1950's this figure exceeded 6.3%, and by the 1960's had grown to 9-11%. This level of military R&D outlays was maintained in the U.S. during the 1970's, i.e. they experienced a constant absolute growth.

In the 1980 fiscal year in the U.S. about \$60 billion were spent for all types of R&D, of which 32% went to military and space programs. Around 240,000 scientists and engineers worked at various military and civilian governmental institutions.¹³ In the 1983 fiscal year \$18.3 billion, or almost 10% of all Pentagon expenditures, were allocated to military R&D.¹⁴

Representatives of the military-industrial complex repeatedly speak with confidence about the supposed stimulative effect of military R&D upon scientific and technical progress in general and on the widespread use of military discoveries and inventions in the civilian sectors. However, this is not supported by practice. The possibilities for the utilization of military R&D for peaceful purposes are limited by considerations of secrecy and by its very character. After all, it is primarily directed towards increasing the accuracy, range, and destructive effect of weaponry. Developing under the conditions of the arms race, military R&D is increasingly diverging from the requirements of the economy's civilian sector.

The distraction of human resources into the military sphere also robs the national economy and constricts its productive potential. In 1981 in the U.S. more than 5.3 million people were directly or indirectly involved in military activities, of this figure, 3.1 million served in the armed forces or worked in various organizations of the Pentagon and more than 2.2 million were indirectly employed in the production of weapons and other resources for the material and technical support of the armed forces.¹⁵ To these figures must be added the considerable number of individuals indirectly participating in military production or the servicing of the armed forces.

The sharp increase in U.S. military expenditures in the immediate years ahead will lead to a growth in the number of individuals drawn from socially useful labor. The creation of the so-called "Rapid Deployment Force" will require an increase in the number of people in the American armed forces, and expanded programs for the procurement of armaments will involve additional tens of thousands of qualified workers and employees in military production.

Naturally, such a waste of resources cannot help but have an effect on the state of the economy, especially in the most militarized states. It is no accident that those Western nations which have large scale military preparedness programs also lag substantially in their economic development rates behind those where military expenditures are expressed in more modest figures. The data in Table 2 are evidence of this.

Table 2. Average Indicators for 1970 - 1979
(In percent)

<u>Nation</u>	<u>Share of GNP</u>		<u>Growth Rate of Labor Productivity</u>
	<u>Military Expenditures</u>	<u>Capital Investment</u>	
United States	6.5	13.9	2.4
Great Britain	5.1	14.7	3.2
France	4.1	16.3	5.8
FRG	3.5	16.8	5.3
Japan	0.9	26.0	8.4

Source: R. Sivard. Op. cit., p 19.

The U.S., occupying first place with respect to military expenditures is in last place with regard to the growth of labor productivity and the financing of capital investment. The second spot, occupied by Great Britain with regard to military expenditures, "supports" its penultimate place in labor productivity and capital investment. Japan, spending a lower proportion of its GNP on armaments, very substantially outdistances these nations in all the basic economic indicators. A similar picture is also observed with regard to such an important indicator as the size of capital investments in various sectors of the economy. The injection of new billions in the form of allocations to increase the NATO war machine in recent years has not only not had a stimulative effect on the economies of bloc members, but has aggravated even further the consequences of crises and slumps. One can not, of course, explain all the ailments of the capitalist economy as just the result of military expenditures. However, the majority of researchers, including bourgeois ones, speak convincingly of the undoubted and weighty "contribution" of the arms race to the development and exacerbation of these illnesses.

Thus, in the U.S. the diversion of vast resources to military R&D, to the detriment of the economy's civilian sector has led to the reduced competitiveness of American productions not only on the world market, but also on the domestic market. The result, as S. Melman, an American economist and professor at Columbia University, notes, is that 20% of the automobiles, 20% of the cast steel industry products, 48% of the footwear and the majority of the radio and television receivers consumed in the U.S. in the second half of the 1970's were of foreign manufacture.¹⁶

The arms race, as has already been stated, in the final account promotes the growth in unemployment. This is proven by a number of studies. One often encounters assertions in the American press that the Pentagon, be it as it may, is a large employer and is partially "reabsorbing" the nation's army of unemployed. However, this is an open deception of the public. According to studies conducted by the American consulting firm, Employment Research Associates, \$1 billion invested in rockets creates 14,000 jobs. The use of the same amount in, for example, health care would create 48,000 jobs, that is, almost 3.5 fold more.¹⁷

In the estimate of the above mentioned American economist, S. Melman, the switching of \$40 billion (in 1969 prices) from the U.S. military budget to civilian programs would permit the creation of 4.5 million new jobs.¹⁸ In addition to this, almost as many new jobs would be added due to the corresponding growth of related production and the service sector. Consequently, high military expenditures only promote the growth of unemployment and by no means its reabsorption. This is also supported by the following data: by the beginning of 1982 the army of unemployed in the U.S. has reached 10 million, in Great Britain, 3 million, and in the FRG, France, and Italy, 2 million each.

One should also note that the arms race and the ensuing sharpening of international tensions, and the imposition by imperialist powers of all sorts of sanctions, embargoes, etc, leads to the curtailment of mutually advantageous East - West trade and economic ties. This, in its turn reduces employment in the capitalist nations due to a loss of orders from socialist nations, and retards the reabsorption of the unemployed. Many Western figures also admit the negative consequences of this policy.

The arms race contributes its share to the inflationary process occurring in NATO nations, especially the most militarized ones as the U.S. and Great Britain. Private corporations filling military orders receive compensation calculated as a certain proportion of the contract's total cost (in the U.S. it is officially 10-11%). From hence comes the "natural" striving of each contractor to maximize the total cost of contract work. This, in its turn, pushes up prices for materials, parts and assemblies delivered by subcontractors to the main military industrial company. Thus, there are higher prices for certain types of raw materials and semifinished goods. These price increases are inevitably shifted to many civilian consumer goods.

The examples examined above cover only part of the broad spectrum of baneful consequences of the Western economies' militarization. The arms race's effect upon the economy is very diverse and deep. Economic studies to estimate it are frequently made in a general manner, presenting the effect on GNP growth rates. One of the studies carried out in the USSR was based upon the comparison of GNP in a hypothetical case of the complete lack of military expenditures compared to their actual level.¹⁹ It turned out that during 1947-1977 American society experienced a shortfall totalling about \$3,2 trillion (in 1972 prices). This is almost 2.4 fold the GNP in 1977. In addition the average rate of economic growth, which for this period was 3.4%, could, if the military budget were used in the civilian sector, be 23-25% higher. The sharp rise in U.S military expenditures, which has continued since 1977 has undoubtedly affected economic growth rates in subsequent years. According to official data, 1980 GNP in the U.S. did not grow, but declined by 0.3% compared to 1979.

An ever larger number of Americans are connecting the steadily deteriorating economic situation in the nation with the adventuristic policies of the current administration in regard to arms expenditures. For example, the NEW YORK TIMES warns: "President Reagan should not forget that the administration's increases in military potential will do serious damage to the development of the economy which will be felt for decades."

One should note that the negative economic consequences of the arms race are not limited to the national boundaries of the respective states. They touch the entire world community, which is in acute need of the resources necessary to solve many major problems of a global nature (environmental protection, the struggle against hunger and illiteracy in the developing nations, and against epidemics).

FOOTNOTES

1. WALL STREET JOURNAL, 28 January 1980, p 16.
2. Computed from "The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1983", Washington, 1982, pp 2-7.
3. BUSINESS WEEK, 21 January 1980, pp 78-89.
4. "Super State", Ed. by H. Schiller and J. Phillips, Chicago, 1970, p 10.
5. DEFENSE MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, March-April 1979, p 12.
6. WORKING PAPERS, May-June 1979, pp 52-55
7. Author's calculations using American statistical data.
8. NEWSWEEK, 14 December 1981, p 20.
9. "The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal year 1983", pp 5-10.
10. R. Sivard, "World Military and Social Expenditures, 1981", Leesburg, 1981, p 27.
11. SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, March 1980, pp 34-35. Not included here are the costs of military hospitals, residences for military personnel, and other property not having a direct military purpose.
12. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 29 March 1982, p 58.
13. "Statistical Abstract of the United States 1980", Washington, 1980, pp 622, 630.
14. "The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1983", pp 5-10.

15. "Annual Report to the Congress, Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year 1983", Washington, 1982, pp 3-8.
16. THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 19 November 1978, p 2.
17. TIME 22 March 1982, p 37.
18. THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 19 November 1978, p 6.
19. This assumes not only the absence of military expenditures, but also their transfer to civilian needs.
20. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1978, No 6, pp 15-17.

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CHINESE, AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR INDOCHINESE RESISTANCE GROUPS ATTACKED

Moscow MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN' in Russian No 9, Sep 82 pp 19-28

[Article by I. Alekseyev: "The Constructive Position of the Nations of Indochina"/Indochina"]

[Excerpt] Two tendencies are thus being ever more distinctly manifested in contemporary international relations in Southeast Asia. One consists of the forces of socialism as represented by a united Vietnam, Laos, and the new Kampuchea. These three nations are strengthening and developing, maintain the closest political and economic ties with each other and are implementing a course of friendship and thorough cooperation with the Soviet Union and other nations of the socialist community, and for good neighborly relations, peace, and stability in the region.

Another tendency is represented by China and the United States. They are involved in strategic cooperation with anti-Soviet and anti-Vietnamese goals, have arranged a unique division of labor, and are showing a mutual interest in changing the status-quo existing in Indochina. In addition, imperialism, Beijing, and some circles in ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] are attempting to erect a kind of cordon sanitaire around the Indochinese states to force them to change course.

On a political level these forces are attempting to isolate the nations of Indochina from the USSR and other states of the socialist community, and to force them off an independent political course. Attempts are being made to set Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea quarreling among themselves, and to sow seeds of discord in these countries between the people and leadership, and between different religions and nationalities. On an economic level the goal is to bleed the three nations white, especially Vietnam, set up an economic blockade around them, undermine their economies, and provoke the populations into organizing demonstrations and disorders. Finally, the enemies of the Indochinese peoples are conducting an extensive ideological and "psychological" war against them, and spreading propaganda directed towards the demoralization of the population.

The policies of socialist Vietnam are being subjected to more than such hit and run raids. Vietnam is being accused of expansionist plans with respect to all of Southeast Asia. Its leadership is accused of

"intractability" and "aggressiveness" and the rejection of "political settlements" of disputes and the intentional complication of the situation in South-east Asia. The Chinese propaganda machine is constantly directed towards disrupting the efforts of the SRV [Socialist Republic of Vietnam] leadership directed towards normalization of relations with ASEAN member states. Different types of political propaganda campaigns are widely used to accuse the SRV of "aggression" against Kampuchea and Laos, of the use of chemical weapons in these neighboring states, of the creation of the "refugee problem" in Indochina, and of other things.

Various kinds of traitors are being widely enlisted into anti-Vietnamese activities. These turncoats have been bunched together along the borders of the PRC [People's Republic of China] into the "Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Vietnam", and are creating a "front" directed against the VCP [Vietnamese Communist Party] and the government of the SRV. In this same area 16-17 companies of the so-called "liberation army", numbering fifty to sixty people each have been formed. They are conducting raids in the northern regions of the SRV for diversionary and propaganda purposes.

The Chinese authorities continue to keep more than ten divisions along the border with Vietnam, and behind them is a second echelon of several corps. During the three years since the Chinese aggression more than 6,000 provocations by ground troops, a thousand intrusions by aircraft, and tens of thousands of approaches by ships into the waters of the SRV have been committed.*

In recent years the majority of western nations have sharply reduced credits and aid to the SRV, and have cancelled contracts with Vietnamese organizations. Washington has directed efforts towards curtailing assistance to the SRV from international organizations and has, in every possible way, induced its allies not to cooperate with Vietnam. Beijing, in its turn has started to break ties with foreign firms cooperating with Vietnam.

Socialist Laos is also suffering from continuous infringements upon its sovereignty. Implementing the "strategic coordination" of its policies with Beijing, the United States is conducting active subversion against the LPDR [Lao People's Democratic Republic]. Assisted by certain circles in Thailand, they are continuing to supply Laotian counterrevolutionaries with weapons and conducting extensive operations, sending special groups into Laos from Thailand.

As stressed at the 3rd Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (April 1982), the Beijing hegemonists are an "immediate, dangerous enemy of the Lao people. The Chinese province of Yunnan, bordering Laos, is the support point for PRC subversive activities against the northern provinces of Laos. Here there are two centers for the training of Lao counterrevolutionaries (1,500 people). The "Lanna" division, formed from Lao reactionary elements (5,000 - 6,000 people) is quartered here. The base for actions against the central and southern regions of Laos is Thailand, where there are more than 20 centers for organizing Lao reactionaries. In addition Beijing is using armed detachments of the "Communist Party" of Thailand, numbering 4,000, against Laos.

The Beijing leadership is trying to unite all internal and foreign Lao reactionary groups. In September 1980, according to the foreign press, the so-called

* KUAN DOI NIAN ZAN, 28 February 1982

"United Front for the National Liberation of Laos", was formed, which includes representatives from the four main Lao antigovernmental groups. During September - October 1981, under the aegis of Beijing there was a meeting of the Lao counterrevolutionary ringleaders. At the meeting the formation of a "provisional coalition government" of Laos was announced, and plans were worked out for the consolidation of the efforts of Lao, Kampuchean, and southern Vietnamese reactionaries. In November 1981 in Switzerland there was a conference of representatives of the reactionary Lao emigration, patterned after the medley of Kampuchean reactionaries.

In Beijing there is no special attempt to hide intentions with respect to Laos. The Great Han disdain for neighboring small nations permeates the content of leaflets distributed by Chinese agents in Laos: "Laos is a small Indochinese nation with a population of only 3 million people. China is a great power with almost a billion people. Laos should submit to Beijing and forget about friendship with Vietnam. Otherwise Laos will be punished!"

Recently imperialism and Beijing have increased their efforts to put pressure on Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea. As an instrument of this pressure they have selected the so-called "Kampuchean question". In a premeditated fashion the Chinese leadership has developed around this artificial "question" a noisy political and propaganda campaign on the threshold of the Seventh Conference of the Unaligned Nations and the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly. PRC information media are attempting to depict the "Kampuchean problem" as a key to the situation in the entire region, asserting that until, in their words this "problem" is settled, it is impossible to guarantee the security of Thailand and all of Southeast Asia.

Beijing and Washington have given themselves several goals. First, the Chinese leadership is not hiding the fact that it is trying to overthrow, by armed means, the existing legal government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea and to restore the Pol Pot regime. There are some "nuances" in the American position: The State Department has denounced the atrocities of the Pol Pot regime, but that is just a dose of demagogary. It is an undisputable fact that for the last three years the United States has given the Pol Pot butchers decisive support, speaking out at sessions of the UN General Assembly for retaining the representatives of "democratic Kampuchea" in that organization. Secondly, (here the "strategic interests of the PRC and the U.S. coincide completely) there is the attempt to keep the ruling circles of Thailand and other ASEAN lands in positions of confrontation with Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea.

The world community's attention is being increasingly drawn to the role given to Thailand in the far reaching Chinese-American plans. The Chinese hegemonists are in every way possible imposing friendship and alliance upon Thailand. By their efforts (with the knowledge and approval of the U.S.) Thailand has now been converted into an actual base of aggression for the remnants of the Pol Pot followers and other antigovernmental elements opposed to Kampuchea. However, this is not all. There are also Burmese separatists and remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's army in Thailand. The pro-Beijing Communist Party of Malaysia has bases for its detachments in the southern part of the country.

Here one should note a definite sequence and consistency in Chinese policy, directed towards gaining hegemony in Southeast Asia (the present Beijing leadership has inherited from Mao Zedong and the Chinese bourgeois nationalists the view of Asia as a sphere of China's exclusive interests). When one turns to the history of recent decades one sees that it was in Indonesia that China placed its main hopes for attaining its goals in the 1960's. The tragic results of this adventuristic line in 1965 are well known. In the 1970's the Chinese leaders exerted great efforts to convert Kampuchea into a base for penetration into Southeast Asia. After their plans collapsed in January 1979, the Chinese selected Thailand as an object of their intrigues. From their point of view it held the most favorable potentials for these purposes.

It is still difficult to say how the Chinese experiment in Thailand in the 1980's will end. In any case, the Pol Pot armed bands, numbering several tens of thousands, remain on Thai territory and, have essentially already been transformed into an important factor of Chinese influence on the politics of that nation. As a consequence (one should not exclude this turn of events) they may be used as a lever for seizing power in this land.

Not without foundation, some foreign observers consider the Pol Pot armed formations sheltered on Thai territory, to in fact be units of the Chinese Army operating in Southeast Asia. After all, the leadership of the Pol Pot forces is in actual practice exercised by Chinese. The total number of armed advisors from the PRC entrusted with commanders' functions amounts to more than 600, of which half are functioning in the "general staff" and other military organs of the Pol Pot forces, while the remaining are located directly with the troops (about 40-50 per division). The Chinese "advisors" direct and supervise (kontroliruyut) the operations conducted by the Pol Pot forces involving crossings of the Thai-Kampuchean border. The Chinese are also engaged in problems of reconnaissance, the military and political training of troops, and in recruitment. At training bases for Kampuchean set up in Thailand and in China, cadre of middle and higher level commanding personnel and political workers are trained. Finally, weapons with the stamp "Made in China" are in the hands of the Pol Pot bandits.

Recently Beijing began to give military assistance to former opponents of Pol Pot as well. Some quantities of Chinese weapons are arriving in units of the "Sereyka" (the Son Sann group) and the "Molinaka" (under the influence of Sihanouk).

The U. S. is giving active moral and political help, and hidden (through Thailand) military support to the Khmer antigovernmental groups, including the Pol Pot followers. However, this is not its main function in fuss stirred up around the "Kampuchean question". In the "division of labor" between Beijing and Washington the U.S. has assumed responsibility for rearming Thailand. Since the end of the 1970's and especially in the first half of this year, the United States has activated its program for the restoration of military ties with this nation. The administration in Washington, giving consideration to the growing requests of Bangkok for military aid, in order to "resist the growing threat from Vietnam" increased credits to Thailand in 1981 for the purchase of arms from 50 million to 80 million dollars. This year the Thai

government will complete its armed forces modernization program, to which Washington had previously allocated 1 billion dollars.* In addition, according to an announcement by the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, this year the administration in Washington has granted subsidized credits for the purchase of American weaponry totalling 67 million dollars for the purpose of "maintaining the security of Thailand".**

Not long ago --at the end of this June -- China and the U.S., with the active support of ASEAN nations, engaged in scheduled maneuvers around Kampuchea, which might complicate the situation in Southeast Asia even further. In Kuala Lumpur it was announced with great pomp that the so-called "coalition government" of "democratic Kampuchea" has been formed. Its "president" is the ex-monarch Sihanouk, the "vice-president" is Khieu Samphan (one of the ringleaders of the Pol Pot regime, condemned to death by the People's Revolutionary Tribunal in Phnom Penh), and its "prime minister" is one of the Khmer emigrants, Son Sann. The progressive world press was unanimous in stating that this "coalition" was the result of yet another deal between Beijing and Washington, made at the cost of the Kampuchean people: the U.S. forced Son Sann into a coalition with his sworn enemies, the Pol Pot forces, and in exchange obtained China's agreement to soften its approach to military cooperation between the U.S. and Thailand.

Why was this trick needed by the "strategic partners" on both sides of the Pacific Ocean and their accomplices? Their goals are the same: overthrow by military means the people's power in Kampuchea, discredit the policies of Vietnam and the Soviet Union, and in addition keep a Kampuchean seat in the UN for the criminal Pol Pot regime and push this regime into the nonaligned movement.

Those in this "coalition government" have neither the legal nor the moral right to speak in the name of the Kampuchean people. It was not formed by constitutional means, but on the basis of collusion between criminals and renegades, driven out of the nation by the Kampuchean people. It had not and will not have its own territory and population. It is no accident that in view of the situation Sihanouk was forced to take refuge from his "friends" abroad and plan a many month long trip.

Reaction in Asian lands to the creation of the "government", a symbiosis of three groups of Khmer counterrevolutionaries was two faced, and very remarkable. Official circles did not fail to express their support (one incidentally notes a dangerous coincidence -- Chinese propaganda announced the formation of the "coalition" as a historical event).

The publics of the ASEAN lands reacted differently. Understanding that the newly baked "government" is dominated by followers of Pol Pot, they justly noted that the advantage in this deal remains with Beijing, and that this entails intensified Chinese influence in the region, especially in Thailand.

In Thailand itself noted political figures, scholars, and parliamentarians publicly accused the government of playing with fire, stating that its course was essentially one of following the channels of Chinese politics, and that under the influence of Beijing, Thailand was "forced to openly oppose itself to

* FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, August 7-13, 1981

** STRAITS TIMES, March 12, 1982

the states of Indochina". They demand that the government occupy a genuine neutral position in relations with Kampuchea so that the word "neutrality" when applied to Thailand will not mean "neutrality ala Thailand". In Indonesia even Foreign Minister M. Kusumaatmaja was forced to admit that the creation of a "coalition government" hinders a political solution to the "Kampuchean problem" and would assist armed intervention by "red Khmers" into Kampuchean affairs. In all ASEAN capitals concern is expressed that squabbles will continue in the "coalition" of old political opponents: the American henchman Son Sann and the Chinese puppet Khieu Samphan. Sinhua the Chinese news agency reminds readers that the Pol Pot "government" headed by Khieu Samphan, which has existed up until now, will retain the right to resume its functions, if the "coalition government" turns out to be "ineffective".

One can come to only one conclusion: any plans to change the situation in Kampuchea with the help of various counterrevolutionary groups or alliances is utopian. The Kampucheans do not intend to be deflected from their selected path of national renewal. The creation of an anti-Kampuchean coalition hinders the prospects for a constructive dialogue between the states of Indochina and ASEAN lands and pushes them to a new level of confrontation. In summary, this only postpones rather than brings nearer the realization of Southeast Asian peoples' hopes for security and a peaceful future.

Those who now announce their support of the newly appeared "coalition" are essentially helping the Pol Pot butchers come out of international isolation, and are adding grist to the mill of Beijing's policies. For example, with Chinese help Sihanouk is planning to penetrate the nonaligned movement and occupy Kampuchea's seat there. This would be a step backwards for the entire movement, which has already dissociated itself from the Pol Pot forces. If the so-called "Kampuchean question" is put out for discussion at the conference, then undoubtedly international reaction will use it in its plans to disrupt the nonaligned movement, to fragment it, and to divert its participants from the real growing problems of the struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism. It has long been time to drive the Pol Pot representative from the UN. However, here also Beijing is counting upon prolonging the authority of the Pol Pot forces under the shield of the "coalition government".

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CMEA INTEGRATION: NEED FOR PLANNING, TIES BETWEEN PRODUCTION COMPLEXES

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[Article by Y. Shiryayev, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Professor N. Bautina, D. Sc. (Econ.)]

[Text] Demands made of the systems of economic planning and managing increase in conditions of the switchover of the economy of the USSR and the other socialist community countries to a predominantly intensive type of reproduction. The need to "consistently improve planning, ensure organic interaction of the plan, the economic levers and incentives, perfect organizational structures and methods of management"¹ was stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress.

In connection with the development of socialist economic integration the upgrading of the national economic mechanisms is increasingly becoming a common task of socialist countries. The further deepening of the all-round economic and scientific and technological cooperation of the CMEA countries demands, as it was stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress, a constant study of experience accumulated by them in organizing and managing socialist production at all levels. This is demanded not only by the common requirements of the further upgrading of the practice of socialist management but also by the need to fulfil such tasks of the CMEA countries' development of the economic integration set by life as "aligning the structures of economic mechanisms, further extending direct ties between ministries, amalgamations and enterprises participating in cooperation, and establishing joint firms".²

Two aspects, we believe, are most important in the practical solution of all these problems: the proportion of the common and the specific in the development of national economic mechanisms and also the establishment of possible areas of their coalescence and the concrete instruments that should be regarded as the top-priority projects of this coalescence on an agreed-upon basis.

As regards the *first aspect* one should take into account the fact that the economic mechanism should not be viewed as a system with parameters set once and for all. Practice has shown that the perfection of economic management and planning is a continuous process. Every stage of the building of socialism and communism sets a number of definite tasks the fulfilment of which presupposes the fuller utilization of certain economic stimuli and organizational and economic forms. This determines

¹ Documents and Resolutions. The 26th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1981, p. 171.

² Ibid., p. 12.

the actual economic mechanism that services the functioning of socialist economic system in the given historical conditions. From this viewpoint the most substantial distinctions are between the economic mechanisms in countries that are fulfilling tasks of the transitional period and in countries that have built a developed socialist society.

In addition, there exist differences in the national systems of planning and management obtaining from the specifics of sectoral and territorial structures, the scale of economic complexes, the extent of their participation in the international division of labour, existing traditions of running the economy, and so on. These differences can also stem from the concept of individual countries of upgrading the instruments of the economic mechanism and of searching for concrete organizational forms and management meeting the requirements of the given economic complex.

The inevitable specificity of national economic mechanisms determined by all these factors means that the question of their full unification, of reducing them to some single model cannot be put on the agenda in the foreseeable future. At the present stage of socio-economic development it is necessary to widely use such a crucial reserve of raising the efficiency of socialist economic management as exchange of experience and the wide utilization on this basis of rational economic and organization solutions found in individual CMEA countries that have proved their worth in practice.

Naturally, national specifics of economic mechanisms under socialism have their objective limits, determined by the very nature of the new social system.³ Yet, we are dealing here with a typical example of differences within a unity. It is clear, for instance, that these specifics cannot be applied to such fundamental characteristics of the socialist economic system as the dominance of ownership by the whole people, planning an organic component of which is the use of levers of self-accounting and incentives, and the implementation of the socialist principle of distribution according to work.

From this point of view one cannot regard as tenable, for instance, the proposals appearing sometimes in the works of economists in some CMEA countries that boil down to replacing self-accounting with commercial accounts (for instance, under the pretext of adjusting the economic mechanism to the requirements of the economy's more extensive involvement in the international division of labour). The economic mechanism cannot be characterized as a sum total of organizational instruments, forms and levers devoid of a concrete socio-economic thrust. It is called upon to serve expanded socialist reproduction and, consequently the reproduction of socialist production relations as well.

Lenin associated the formation of the economic mechanism with vigorous activity of the socialist state, and with economic policy.⁴ At the present stage of development of socialism the concrete forms, instruments and levers of the economic mechanism are forms and instruments of planned management carried out on the scale of the national economy as a whole and its separate structural elements. The objective nature of the economic mechanism lies precisely in the fact that the planned management of social production is a form of developing the economy inherent in socialism. "Socialism is inconceivable," Lenin wrote, "without planned state

³ In economic literature relations of management are rightly regarded, in our opinion, as an active component of production relations.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, pp. 90-91.

organization, which keeps tens of millions of people to the strictest observance of a unified standard in production and distribution."⁵ It is only on the basis of planned control of the actions of the subjects of management that it becomes possible to subordinate production of a developed social nature to economic interests of the whole people.

Thus, the common principles of socialist economic management are also objectively determining the framework within which it is possible to search for solutions through the economic mechanism that are specific for a given country, and by the same token, to effect an international exchange of experience in this field.⁶ Obviously, just any economic and managerial decisions, irrespective of their fundamental content and expected consequences, cannot become an object of such an exchange.

"This approach stems from a profound analysis of questions of organizing production, management and resolving economic problems on the socialist community level contained in the materials of the 26th CPSU Congress. The Congress not only stressed the vast importance of a mutual study of the diverse positive experience of socialist economic management accumulated in individual countries but also demonstrated a direct connection between the solution of key socio-economic tasks in individual fraternal countries with the further upgrading of the forms and methods of mutual cooperation, the utilization of fundamental advantages of the new type of international relations which in our time, in the socialist world "have truly become relations between nations. Millions upon millions of people take an immediate part in them".⁷

When studying the *second aspect* of this problem it should be noted that the experience of economic management accumulated in each of the countries is of unquestionable interest both in terms of theory and practice. But experience exchange in the field of forms and methods of economic management should deal with ways of solving similar problems of developing the national economy and common tasks and economic cooperation. It appears expedient, therefore, to ascertain the main objects (or spheres) of experience exchange in socialist economic management. As we see it, the selection of these objects should accord both with demands of adjusting economic mechanisms to the aims and tasks facing a country at the present stage and the need to intensify the coordination of the CMEA countries' national mechanisms and the international mechanism of economic cooperation.

With due account for these considerations it appears expedient to us to concentrate experience exchange in socialist economic management in such spheres of planning and management as the creation of conditions for scientific and technological progress and the implementation of its

⁵V. I. Lenin, COLLECTED WORKS, Vol. 27, p. 339.

⁶ It is to this aspect of the problem that attention was drawn in his speech at the 36th Session of the CMEA (Budapest, June 1982) by the head of the Polish delegation Wojciech Jaruzelski who noted that in the process of upgrading methods of managing the economy Poland uses the experience of the other socialist community countries "which confirms once again that socialism is a viable system, flexible in the selection of concrete solutions allowing for a constant improvement of the methods of managing the economy while retaining the principles of the system, such as the dominant role of public ownership of the means of production, centralized planning and priority of social interests".

⁷ Documents and Resolutions. The 26th Congress of the CPSU, p. 9.

accomplishments; the use of commodity-monetary instruments in the practice of economic planning; forms and methods of carrying out integration measures; the establishment of a rational combination of centralized economic planning and the economic independence of amalgamations, complexes and organizations, including questions of the orientation of the main cost-accounting units at the development of economic cooperation with the CMEA countries. Of special importance is experience exchange in managing external economic activity at all levels (national, sectoral and those of economic organizations).

The most complex task, it appears, is the *coalescence of the systems of planning and management as a whole*. This is connected not only with the specifics of national systems (determined by the concrete conditions of conducting economic activities in individual countries) but also by the fact that the socialist community countries actively search for and test decisions in the field of the economic mechanism to adjust it to the changed reproduction conditions.

To some extent it is a multiple-variant economic experiment, the best results of which can be recommended for wide use only after thorough testing in practice and a detailed analysis.

This, of course, does not mean that it is necessary to desist from multilateral and bilateral participation in work in this direction until the national economic mechanisms "get settled". The upgrading process, as was noted above, is continuous. For this reason it *appears expedient to intensify the multilateral nature of this process* (for instance, as one of the key objects of coordinating the economic policy of the interested CMEA countries). The arrangement of a system of a sort of "collective testing" would promote not only the intensification of experience exchange in socialist economic management but would also become an important precondition for developing the national mechanisms in mutually agreed upon areas, for ensuring their growing orientation at serving the all-round interaction of economic complexes.

It is only natural that the introduction of various methods of planning and management is a sovereign matter of each socialist country. Yet at the same time, it is just as obvious that the results of national research in this field are of considerable interest to the entire community from the standpoint of both the prospects of deepening the interaction of national economic mechanisms and their economic and social efficiency. The practice of recent years has demonstrated, for instance, that such consequences of irrational economic management as excessive external debt, internal imbalance, etc., ultimately affect the entire community and sometimes make other fraternal countries divert considerable resources.

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Vast reserves exist at the present stage in the organization of a regular *exchange of forms and methods of fulfilling concrete national economic tasks in individual branches of production, in inter-sectoral production complexes and in the non-productive sphere*. The aim of intensifying mutual exchange in this sphere was formulated in Leonid Brezhnev's report to the 26th CPSU Congress.

This aspect was also singled out at the 36th CMEA Session by Soviet delegation head Nikolai Tikhonov. Thus, it was noted in his speech that many CMEA countries are taking effective measures to save fuel, raw materials and energy. In recent years, for instance, the GDR and Hungary have succeeded in boosting production while reducing the volume of

energy consumption. Considerable technical achievements in this field also exist in other countries, including the Soviet Union. But the accumulated experience has not yet been placed within the reach of all.

We intend, Nikolai Tikhonov continued in his speech, to make wider use of the experience accumulated by individual CMEA countries, to proceed from information exchange to mutually advantageous cooperation in the introduction into practice of the advanced technologies used in the development of the agro-industrial complex.^{*}

In this connection stress should be laid on the need for consistently fulfilling the targets formulated in the Section 8 of the Comprehensive Programme for Socialist Economic Integration where, among other things, the following main aspects of direct ties between ministries, departments and other economic units are mentioned:

- information exchange on the state, experience and ideas concerning the development of scientific and technological, production and trade activities, planning, the organization and management of production and also in the services sphere;

- cooperation in research and development, scientific and technological forecasting and analyses, coordination and joint conducting of research, design and development work, exchange of technical documentation and scientific and technological accomplishments;

- cooperation in specialization and cooperation in production, and planning of production capacities;

- cooperation in the development and use of modern technological processes, particularly in the automation and mechanization of production;

- cooperation in the services sphere, organization and fulfilment of contract work, rendering of technical assistance, and organization of services.

The development of direct ties of economic units of various levels, including amalgamations, complexes, and large enterprises, R & D organizations, is a prerequisite for intensifying exchange of advanced production experience and know-how.

Discussing the problem of direct ties we have approached the third complex of problems connected with the deepening of the interaction of the planning and management systems in the CMEA countries—the *coalescence of the forms and methods of managing external economic activities*.

Describing this aspect of the cohesion of economic mechanisms as a "complex problem" is by no means a formal tribute to the comprehensive approach without which a scientific analysis of any complicated socio-economic phenomena is inconceivable today. The coalescence of the forms and methods of managing external economic activities is an intricate process involving virtually all levels of socialist economic management.

From this point of view the mutual adjustment of external economic organizational structures and regulators in the CMEA countries can be regarded, on the one hand, as a top-priority task of drawing together economic mechanisms (inasmuch as these mechanisms interact directly first of all in the process of serving mutual economic and scientific and technological ties). On the other hand, the mutual adjustment of external economic systems of planning and management does not remove a problem of aligning the national economic mechanisms as a whole (at least

* Pravda, June 9, 1982

in such indicators as their common orientation at serving predominantly the intensive type of reproduction and the deepening of effective and mutually advantageous forms of integration ties corresponding to this type of reproduction).

For this reason it is necessary to identify top-priority tasks, the attainment of which facilitates and stimulates the development of progressive areas of external economic ties, and the ultimate aim—the overcoming of any barriers to rational economic activity within the socialist community as a developing international economic complex. Obviously, the ultimate aim can be attained only in the remote future.

But even considering such a distinction between top-priority and long-range tasks it is necessary to constantly check the decisions in the field of planning and managing external ties against the common fundamental directions of the development of forms and methods of socialist economic management. Thus, it would be an oversimplification to present matters in such a way that a simple coalescence of the instruments used in foreign trade is capable by itself of deepening socialist integration, of consistent introducing it into the fabric of national economic complexes.

Foreign trade is the most universal means of international economic intercourse. But in conditions of integration things go further than just exchanging commodities and services. The centre of gravity of cooperation is increasingly shifting directly to the stage of production (specialization and cooperation in production, construction conducted on the basis of integration, etc.) and the non-production stages (the scientific and technological preparation of production, coordination in investment policy, synchronization of sectoral development concept, and joint establishment of priority cooperation projects).

For this reason the mutual adjustment of individual elements of the national economic mechanisms directly serving external economic ties should be regarded in a broader sense, and include certain measures that also apply to the intra-economic systems of planning and management as a whole. This can be seen with particular clarity from the case of developing direct ties and creating conditions for setting up joint firms and enterprises and pooling the efforts of the interested CMEA countries in other forms.

In the long term the direct ties in the production, science and technology should become an important instrument of forming and developing international production complexes or systems of the socialist type, that is, diverse forms of the international organization of production based on the participation of partners from various countries in the common production process and presupposing regular reciprocal ties (including ties at the stage of the industrial or personal consumption—technical maintenance, service, flexible and prompt reaction to the changing technical requirements to finished products, assemblies, components and semi-finished products).

From this standpoint, one should not underrate the experience of direct production ties already accumulated by the CMEA countries. Such ties, for instance, have formed in the motor vehicle industry and are developing especially intensively in the manufacture of Lada cars, KAMAZ and Skoda trucks, and Ikarus buses and Avia vans. Large-scale industrial cooperation is being developed in the production of equipment for atomic power stations, electronics and micro-electronics.

The crux of the matter is not altered by the fact that this cooperation is usually arranged through foreign trade organizations. In this case

foreign trade performs only a service function by synchronizing the work of the cooperating enterprises and research centres within a single programme of production and the technical upgrading of output. The essence of direct production ties lies not in the form of their marketing (through specialized foreign trade organizations or through the commercial departments of enterprises and amalgamations) but in their prime function—to pool efforts of partners to attain common targets.

For this reason the development of direct production ties depends on the level and intensity of international production and scientific and technological cooperation, the share of which in the total volume of the mutual cooperation of the CMEA countries is steadily growing. For this reason these ties should be regarded not as an aim in itself but as an important lever of raising the efficiency of socialist economic integration.

It is in this context that they are regarded in the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress which set the task of improving direct contacts between ministries, production amalgamations, enterprises and organizations in the USSR and the other CMEA countries, participating in cooperation.^{*} The growing role of cooperation will also promote the fulfilment of such tasks set by the Congress as the establishment of joint firms and the research for other forms of pooling the efforts and making rational use of resources of socialist countries.

It also follows from the above-stated that direct ties should not be studied apart from the overall system of the CMEA countries' mutual cooperation and should particularly not be opposed to such forms of collaboration on the level of national economies as the coordination of five-year plans and the drafting of long-term programmes of cooperation on a multilateral or bilateral basis.

Important preconditions have been created in the years of the fulfilment of the Comprehensive Programme for Socialist Economic Integration for solving, for example, the question of organically including direct production ties in the overall system of cooperation of the CMEA countries. These preconditions exist first of all in the establishment of the most substantial (pattern) areas of their development set by the long-term target-oriented programmes of cooperation, long-term bilateral programmes of specialized and cooperative production, as well as large-scale multilateral and bilateral agreements. This creates conditions for a clear-cut orientation of the direct ties, for preventing the possibility of a certain dilution of mutual cooperation as a result of the burgeoning of weakly interconnected contacts on economic organizations' level. Thus, there appears a tendency now to subordinate the direct ties of sectoral managerial bodies to the aims of forming and realizing the agreed-upon technical policy of the development of the relevant economic sectors. The direct ties on the other levels of managing the national economy are also turning into an ever more substantial element of the material basis of coordinating the production and research activity of the CMEA countries.

All this does not mean, of course, that direct production ties are becoming fully dissolved in the sum total of forms of cooperation effected on the level of national economies, and are shedding their specifics. While facilitating the fulfilment of accords reached on that level, they play

^{*} *Documents and Resolutions. The 26th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1981, p. 235.*

quite an independent role by ensuring the prompt solution of a multitude of daily problems concerning the interaction of thousands of enterprises, amalgamations and research organizations.

The expansion of direct ties of cooperation is becoming a method of tackling the most pressing problem of intensifying CMEA economic development—that of an accelerated introducing into practice scientific and technological breakthroughs. All forms of direct contacts between industrial and research centres should be oriented first of all exactly at the solution to this problem. In the final analysis the task of direct ties boils down to the maximum saving of socially necessary time spent on the development and manufacture of goods incorporating the latest scientific and technological achievements by the partners.

Direct cooperation ties are proving to be the most effective in solving many questions of production cooperation for their flexibility and effectiveness. This applies, in particular, to such problems as the updating of output or switchover to the production of new types of it. Thus, the record has shown that the terms and time of delivery of some units or assemblies for the output of pilot samples of products or production installations can by far not always be stipulated in long-term international agreements on specialization and cooperation and also in the five-year export and import plans of the partners. It is also difficult to set in advance the concrete prices of the products because their technical and economic indicators can be determined only after their development and introduction into production. What is needed in such cases are prompt contacts that differ from conventional foreign trade transactions by the formalities that are required, by the manner accounts are settled, and so on.

But it is precisely in this sphere that most substantial difficulties arise in practice. Foremost among them are problems of balancing mutual deliveries within the framework of direct production ties and differences in the sphere of competence in external economic activity possessed by enterprises and amalgamations of individual countries within their common systems of economic planning and management. Also of substantial importance are differences in the methods of interaction between production and foreign trade organizations.

What with the growing role of amalgamations, complexes and large enterprises in the national economies of the CMEA countries better preconditions are now appearing for the establishment of direct production ties between them, even though a number of unsolved problems remain here. For example, the systems of economic planning and management existing in many countries provide insufficient scope to levers directly stimulating the development of both internal and international cooperation in production. It appears that the development of such levers can be accomplished most successfully on the basis of summing up the collective experience of the CMEA countries in this field and the introduction into practice, on this basis, of the most effective (and also operating in one and the same area) economic, organizational and juridical decisions.

It is clear that such stimulation cannot be limited only to the perfection of self-accounting within enterprises and amalgamations. Since by far not all the effects on the cooperation in production can be detected at the level of enterprises and amalgamations, and even individual sectors of the national economy, it is necessary to create a system for operating on a profitable basis and evaluating them on the scale of the national

economy. On this basis it will be possible within each national economic complex to determine the actual contribution made by cooperation to economic and scientific and technological progress and, consequently, the amount of resources that it is feasible from the viewpoint of national economic interests to invest in stimulating them.

In addition to improving the corresponding normative documents the utilization of reserves in this field could also be improved by introducing into practice such forms as the establishment of specialized technical service centres, the conclusion of agreements on technical servicing, and so on. Such forms of cooperation could facilitate the creation of more favourable conditions for cooperation in general since close ties between the manufacturer and the consumers of export produce are established in the process of technical servicing.

A sophisticated system of direct production ties also requires a smoothly operating information base making it easier to search for partners. International organizations and firms can play a key role here. A certain amount of experience has already been accumulated. Yet there is a need for a serious analysis to determine the specific conditions in which organizations and firms will be able to play the role of centres arranging cooperation and other production ties in individual industries.

It follows from all this that problems of deepening economic collaboration are multifaceted and complex, and for this reason, should not be oversimplified. At the same time, new possibilities are opening in this field reflecting the objective need to mobilize the reserves of raising the efficiency of socialist economic management contained in it.

The 26th CPSU Congress scientifically substantiated the main areas of the further coalescence of the systems of planning and managing the external ties of the CMEA countries within socialist economic integration. They include supplementing the coordination of economic development plans with synchronizing economic policy as a whole, aligning the structures of national economic mechanisms, and more extensive exchange of experience in socialist economic management.

To fulfil the decisions of the Congress specific measures have been taken in the Soviet Union to upgrade direct ties between various ministries, production amalgamations, enterprises and organizations of the USSR and those of the CMEA cooperating countries. The responsibility of all economic units for the fulfilment of obligations in the field of external economic relations has been heightened. A search is underway in the Soviet Union and the other CMEA countries for new possibilities of developing mutual cooperation to ensure rational utilization of the huge scientific and technological and production potential and the material, financial and labour resources of the socialist countries with the aim of jointly solving the problems of intensifying the development of the national economies and creating additional sources of commodities.

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CIA CONTROL OF WESTERN MEDIA IN ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN ALLEGED

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 11, Nov 82 pp 74-80

[Article by Y. Nalin: "The Big Lie of the Century ("Soviet Threat" Myth and Imperialist Propaganda)"]

[Text]

The ideological struggle in the world today centres round the problem of peace as the crucial condition of social progress and mutually beneficial cooperation between states. Hundreds of millions of people in various parts of the globe have responded with profound satisfaction and understanding to the series of large-scale Soviet initiatives aimed at eliminating the threat of nuclear war and ensuring a lasting world peace.

Losing the battle for people's hearts and minds, the aggressive circles of the United States and NATO made another ideological move recently. Speaking in British Parliament during his European tour, US President Reagan announced the start of a new "crusade" against the Soviet Union and socialism, which "will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history".

Such overt use of the old ideological and psychological arsenal, which in the past six and a half decades has on many occasions proved utterly ineffective, is indicative of the bankruptcy of bourgeois ideology which has found itself unable to offer an alternative to socialism attractive enough to the Western public. Hence the stake on political and military confrontation with the socialist community, with ideology being used mainly to justify a new round of the arms race, provocation of enmity and hatred, and militaristic hysteria in the cold war spirit.

However, power politics and the drive for military superiority over socialism clearly do not enjoy the backing of world public opinion, which is placing the Western propaganda machine in a tight spot. Having declared an "ideological war" against the Soviet Union and making it a matter of state policy, it is trying in vain at least to justify the political volte-face. The spiritual poverty of the apologists of the moribund social system manifests itself once again here: they can offer nothing but the unproved and unvarying assertion about an increased "Soviet threat".



The "Soviet threat" myth is not new and can be traced back to the time the Soviet Union was founded. In fact, it underlies the long-term propaganda doctrine of imperialism. Initially, the myth was presented as a "red" or "Bolshevik" danger. Lenin wrote on that score: "Some foolish people are shouting about red militarism. These are political crooks who pretend that they believe this absurdity and throw charges of this kind

right and left, exercising their lawyers' skill in concocting plausible arguments and in throwing dust in the eyes of the masses."¹

This characteristic of "political crooks" has not lost its meaning. Intimidation by a "Soviet threat" in the struggle against socialism is a "universal method" of imperialist reaction. It is used most vigorously when contradictions in the capitalist world are aggravated and the ruling circles of imperialist states cannot cope with the difficulties inherent in the capitalist system. This method was used by those who contemplated an aggression against the USSR way back before World War II. The spectres of "red danger" and "a threat from the East" have always been used by the expansionist circles in the West to cover up their own hegemonistic claims in keeping with the traditional imperialist policy of world domination.

In our day the "Soviet threat" myth has acquired the significance of a general ideological platform for the consolidation of all forces of world reaction: the military-industrial complexes of the United States and NATO, fascist and dictatorial regimes, other reactionary forces. This ideological sabotage is unparalleled in the scope and intensity of using the material and technical means by various propaganda services.

The fact that the massive campaign around a "Soviet threat" has swelled to immense proportions, that it is coordinated and synchronized, has multi-purpose and long-term goals and is supervised by the men in the higher echelons of power in capitalist countries—all this gives us reason to state that the new ideological sabotage against the USSR had been prepared in advance: Western Sovietologists had elaborated the main arguments and theses around the "Soviet threat" myth to be used in due time. Even before the main propaganda forces were brought into play, the bourgeois mass media were already being coached to fulfil this task by conducting "tactical" operations, so to speak.

Over the past years, the press, radio and TV in the West have been reiterating the same propaganda clichés about the buildup of the Soviet military potential which allegedly exceeds the USSR's defence needs; about Soviet nuclear missile superiority, a Soviet naval threat, an "immense" Soviet superiority in conventional arms, specifically tanks, and a "prospect" of their invasion of Western Europe, "plans" to seize the oil-fields in the Persian Gulf, and about "militarization of Soviet society".

It is not hard to see a direct connection between the foreign policy moves of the US Administration and the NATO leadership towards the worsening of the international climate, the escalation of the arms race and torpedoing detente, on the one hand, and the tasks set before the mass media of the West to give this policy a propaganda backing, on the other. The bourgeois mass media spare no effort to bring home to the public the idea that the USSR is to blame for the worsening of Soviet-American relations, for the general deterioration of the world political climate, that the negative turn in world politics was caused by Soviet "expansionist ambitions". Western propaganda displays enviable zeal trying to convince the world that frenzied militarism, the turn of the USA to the cold war tactics and open confrontation with the socialist world are justified and necessary.

It is appropriate to recall here an example from history. Getting ready for the sanguinary war, Hitler declared: "I must keep the gentlemen from Versailles in constant suspense in the face of the Bolshevik threat. I want to make them believe that national-socialist Germany is the only remaining bastion to stop the red torrent." The situation today is different.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 66.

of course, from that between the wars. But as in those years, today the myth of a "threat from the East" and "Soviet expansionism" has served one and the same foreign-policy aims of the imperialists and invariably created international tension.

An infuriated bear, wearing a Russian fur-cap with a red star, grinning blood-thirstily from the Paris *L'Express* magazine; TV viewers on both sides of the Atlantic are shown a "true-to-life" landing of Soviet troops now in Alaska, now on the shores of the English Channel, and similar nonsense. The spread of the war hysteria, fear and a feeling of insecurity is caused by the incessant land and naval exercises conducted in West European countries and in various sea regions. All this is done to "counter Soviet expansion" and is given wide publicity, straining the nerves of the man in the street. Despite real facts of today and historical experience, people are told that the Soviet Union threatens their states, and that not only a return to the cold war but a military catastrophe are inevitable.

Incidentally, it is practically impossible to find in the bourgeois press an explanation why, for instance, the Soviet Union needs war, why it "seeks military superiority" and why Soviet peace initiatives are "propaganda". By spreading the myth about a "Soviet threat" the Western news media completely ignore the class nature of relations of states in the international arena, deliberately do not mention the content of the Peace Programme proclaimed at the 24th and 25th Congresses of the CPSU and supplemented with new major moves at the latest forum of the Soviet Communists, and give a distorted interpretation, or conceal altogether, the peace initiatives of the CPSU and the Soviet state aimed at strengthening peace and international cooperation. In the West they prefer to be silent about them and repeat over and over again "Soviet military superiority", using falsified data in the bargain.

Some or other Soviet moves are misinterpreted to vilify the foreign policy of socialism and divert world public opinion from the provocative aggressive acts of the West.

Take, for instance, the frantic propaganda campaign unleashed in the West around the Afghanistan events. It was intended as a cover up of the imperialist encroachments of the United States. Thus, the fabricated reports on the intention of the Soviet troops to use Afghanistan as a bridgehead for the seizure of Iranian oilfields "for some reason" coincided in time with the preparations of the US subversion against Iran and the escalation of the US naval presence in the Persian Gulf. The provocative allegations of the use of napalm and chemical weapons by Soviet troops against the Afghan population were spread in order to distract public attention from the fact that it is the USA that supplies the Afghan counter-revolutionary gangs with chemical weapons.

While circulating insinuations about the role of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, which entered the country at the request of the Afghan government, the bourgeois mass media are concealing from the Western public what really is going on in Afghanistan. The main papers in the FRG refused to publish reports and pictures by West German journalists, who had spent a month in Afghanistan. The British right-wing press assumed the same attitude towards R. Brown, an MP, who had visited that country and whose view of the issue ran counter to the official line. The Paris press, with the exception of left-wing publications, did not carry the articles written by the French trade union leaders who had been to Afghanistan. Many more instances of this kind could be listed here.

One of the ideological purposes of the myth about a "Soviet military threat" is to distort and falsify the USSR's foreign policy, spread prejudi-

ces among the masses and ingraft false stereotypes in their thinking. Western propaganda agencies resort to cheating by substituting invented "Soviet expansion" for the real causes of particular national or international critical situations. In this way they are trying to justify their own interference in the affairs of other nations. The subversive actions against Poland are clear evidence of this.

The unprecedented political, economic and ideological pressure being exerted by Washington and its allies on Poland is being accompanied by a stream of shameless lies and slander concerning the events taking place in the country and around it. According to *l'Humanite*, 12 right-wing dailies, several weeklies, three TV programmes and five radio stations are working in France to fan the hysteria around the situation that has taken shape in Poland.

The bourgeois media, manipulated by government organs and secret agencies, have become an instrument of interference in the internal affairs of this sovereign state. And again the "Soviet threat" myth was used to "justify" such policy. Western propaganda endeavours to prove that the resolute measures taken by the Polish leadership to eliminate the threat to socialism in the country were "a result of interference and pressure from Moscow". Resorting to downright lies, Reuters reported that Soviet troops in Polish uniforms had sneaked into Poland in advance to take part in repressive actions. The story of "Russians in Polish uniforms" appeared in many papers, not only in the London press. *Oakland Tribune-East Bay Today* wrote that the Soviets are landing in Warsaw. *International Herald Tribune*, it seems, did not mention "Russians in Poland", but it urged Polish soldiers to turn their weapons against the "hated historical enemy".

These irresponsible and provocative statements show that the Western media still intend to "erode" the socialist community and sap the positions of world socialism.

The great significance of the mass media in our time is indisputable. The press, radio and TV not only enable tens of millions of people to witness the events but shape public opinion and serve as a major instrument of pursuing a definite policy. The responsibility of those working in the mass media for the content of information and its educational effect is enormous. This is a force capable of promoting social progress and economic advancement, improving understanding between nations and facilitating a positive solution of major domestic and international political problems. It can also be used to achieve the opposite goals, such as distorting the truth, stepping up international tensions and promoting misanthropy. The reactionary circles are trying to use the mass media as an instrument of causing distrust and enmity between nations and creating an explosive situation in the world.

To give the "psychological war" against socialism a purposeful character and step up the large-scale involvement of the mass media in it, they have taken a series of organizational measures and held several meetings on the common strategy and tactical methods to be used in the far reaching "anti-detente" operation.

In the USA, for instance, much attention was devoted to expanding the activities of the International Communication Agency (ICA), the central agency for foreign policy propaganda.² "Now Ronald Reagan

² The US President recently signed a decision to rename the International Communication Agency the US Information Agency.

is rearming the nation's public-relations agency for a bold new war of words with the Soviets", wrote *Newsweek* at the end of last year in an article whose title speaks for itself: "A Hot Cold War Heats up the ICA". A no less revealing assessment of the Agency's work was made by its director Charles Z. Wick: "We are at war (with the Soviets), whether de facto or declared".

In fanning up war hysteria and spreading fear "of the Soviets" the growing role is played by the department most interested in it—the Pentagon. There is, according to a special study published in New York, one of the biggest government apparatuses directing the flow of information and propaganda, which in no way contradicts the established course or programmes of the Pentagon in particular and the Administration as a whole.³ According to US data, about 4,500 persons are employed by the Defense Department to condition public opinion in the way required by Washington. The US Congress, it is said in the study, does not limit the sums to be spent on this; in 1960 the amount shot up 15-fold and is now nearing \$200 million a year. The Pentagon has about 300 radio and TV stations in various parts of the world officially catering for US servicemen abroad but in fact they directly influence the frame of mind of the local population. The Pentagon issues hundreds of books, pamphlets, newspapers, and magazines with the total annual edition of 8 million copies, and makes militaristic films.

All remember the propaganda farce staged by the US Defense Department last autumn around the publication of the pamphlet *Soviet Military Power*. The authors of this, another falsification by the Pentagon, advertized it as the biggest exposure of secret US intelligence data on a "Soviet threat". The foreword to the pamphlet was written by the Pentagon chief himself. The Defense Department virtually raked the nerves of not only Americans but also the people of the NATO countries and Japan: the Pentagon had hired a satellite telecommunication system to enable the Defense Secretary personally to tell the people overseas about the "menacing Soviet military might," to frighten, mislead and misinform Western public opinion.

And though the propaganda ruse failed, the Pentagon has far from abandoned attempts to influence public opinion. As before, information (or misinformation, to be more precise) of all kinds is cooked up in the Pentagon and then circulated through the press, radio and TV all over the country. The mechanism is very simple: the Pentagon conducts regular briefings of the journalists who see eye to eye with its official spokesmen.

The role of the mass media as a powerful instrument of foreign and domestic policies, a tool of shaping public opinion, is also taken into account by the secret services of capitalist countries. In the United States the CIA is firmly entrenched in the press, radio, TV, cinema and publishing. According to *International Herald Tribune*, the CIA has secretly built a global propaganda network of its own. It is not only a leading centre setting the main line of propaganda campaigns, but supplies deliberately distorted information to Western news agencies, fixing the time for some or other action and ensuring their international coordination. Indeed, the paper says, the CIA has in the sphere of its influence over 800 various organs of propaganda. News prepared in the CIA or to its order is used by hundreds of newspapers and dozens of news agencies, to say nothing of the radio stations Liberty and Free Europe operating under the CIA.

³ See J. Heise, *Minimum Disclosure: How the Pentagon Manipulates the News*, New York, 1980.

Recent years have seen quite a few exposures of ties between the US intelligence service and the press, of the recruitment of journalists by secret services and the role assigned to the mass media by the leaders of the "cloak and dagger" agency. Today no one even bothers to conceal these facts. The CIA has been included, together with the Department of State and the Pentagon, in the inter-departmental commission set up by the US Administration and instructed by the President to supervise US propaganda and coordinate it in the USA and with the NATO countries.

The main lines of the CIA's activities in this area are ideological subversion, the struggle against communist ideology and existing socialism, the Soviet Union above all, and the spread of the "Soviet threat" tenet. The "secret" reports written in Langley on the foreign and domestic policies of the USSR often appear to set off provocative anti-Soviet campaigns after an arranged information "leakage" through CIA-connected editorial boards.

The financial oligarchy, the military-industrial complexes and the right-wing bourgeoisie are behind the propaganda sallies of imperialism and ideological sabotage. Today they not only set the general anti-socialist guidelines for the policies of bourgeois states but take an ever greater part in various anti-Soviet and anti-socialist campaigns. This tendency not only is typical of the USA, it has become widespread in other Western countries as well.

A peculiar stock-exchange operation took place in France recently. The military-industrial concern Matra manufacturing arms—from pistols to radar installations, tanks, missiles and electronic equipment—and having a large amount of shares in the motor, watch-making and other industries, has purchased Hachette, one of the world's largest publishing trusts. Hachette owns dozens of weeklies and magazines (*Le Point*, *Le Journal du Dimanche*, *Télé-7-Jours*, *Elle*, etc.), the biggest publishing houses (Stock, Fayard, Grasset, *Le Livre de Poche*) and two TV firms, and handles the transportation and delivery of practically all newspapers and magazines in the country. Considering that by that time Matra already controlled the French radio station Europe-1, the Monte Carlo television, and the press of the country's eastern regions, it becomes clear that this military-industrial corporation has become not only the biggest press and book-publishing group in France expressing the interests of the military-industrial complex, but has set up a very powerful complex in the communications sphere due to its presence in such areas as information science, telemechanics, manufacture and use of satellites, radio and television. There is every indication that the significance of this complex will continue to grow.

In West Germany, the Bundeswehr plays a leading role in the manipulation of public thinking. Its propaganda centre is the Headquarters for the Press and Information of the Federal Ministry of Defence, which is closely linked with relevant NATO agencies. The Headquarters directs and coordinates the coverage of military policy problems by the mass media. Among the measures practiced regularly are "statements for the press", news conferences, meetings of journalists with spokesmen of the Bundeswehr top brass and publication of a large amount of special information. A great number of military analysts zealously vindicating the military concepts of the West work in the West German media. Many of them had served in Hitler's Wehrmacht and are convinced anti-Sovieteers and revenge-seekers. Today they are ready and willing proponents of the arms race, intimidating the West Germans with the notorious "Soviet threat".

Nearly all bourgeois mass media are involved today in the propaganda campaign going on in the West under the false "Soviet threat" slogan.

Professional anti-communists on both sides of the Atlantic attempt to enlist the services of some statesmen, members of parliament and public figures in hostile propaganda acts. Some of these have found themselves unable to resist skilfully provoked anti-Soviet hysteria.

The turning of the ideological struggle against socialism into an element of state policy enables the imperialist forces to coordinate propaganda attacks against socialist countries and Communist Parties and democratic movements in individual capitalist states and on a global scale.

An example of such joint activity is the Western powers' cooperation in NATO where they combine the threat of force with ideological sabotage and give a powerful propaganda backing to their militaristic policy. NATO strategists attach great importance to the "psychological war", regarding it as a specific weapon against communism, the socialist community, and against all peace-loving nations.

The information service of the NATO headquarters in Evere, near Brussels, is the propaganda centre of the "psychological war" coordinating the work of the Atlantic propaganda machine. It is in that service that many "ideas" are formed to be subsequently used by the Western media for violent attacks on the foreign and domestic policies of the USSR, fanning up militaristic hysteria and misleading millions of people. The Western press has repeatedly made it clear that the US Administration and the CIA were behind many ideological campaigns orchestrated at the NATO headquarters. Today, too, the NATO information service has joined the US-led propaganda crusade against detente, against the Soviet peace proposals, for spreading the "Soviet threat" myth.

The demand to toughen the information and propaganda activity in that direction was expressed at the December 1979 session of the NATO Council. Discussing the deployment of US medium-range nuclear missiles in a number of West European countries the participants in the session analyzed the propaganda back up of the NATO activities at the time when the antiwar and antimissile movement was mounting in Western Europe and the USA. The Communiqué of the NATO Council session said that the bloc's leaders noted that the work being done was unsatisfactory and expressed the insistent wish that "in view of the Soviet threat" the propaganda of NATO's "defensive" (read: militaristic—Y. N.) efforts be given a still wider scope. The NATO leadership later more than once discussed these matters, including at the NATO Council sessions in May and December 1981 and June 1982, at the so-called Atlantic assemblies and at meetings specially convened for the purpose.

By escalating militaristic hysteria the forces of imperialism and reaction hope to bring home to the world public the idea that "aggressiveness" has always been typical of the USSR. The Soviet peace moves are declared "pure propaganda" designed to "disarm the West" and secure "unilateral advantages" for the USSR. To that end, they have come up with the absurd idea that the capitalist countries must modernize their nuclear potential first and only then discuss disarmament. NATO Secretary-General Joseph Luns, speaking about the large-scale movements in the West against nuclear war, stated bluntly that in the opinion of the allies, these movements which, happily, are active not in all countries, would doubtlessly jeopardize the possibility of preserving peace and reaching an agreement with the USSR. It is hard to imagine anything so far from

the truth. But not to Luns. He further said that was not true that disarmament could prevent war.

This is the direction in which the public is being conditioned by the bourgeois mass media. This is a veritable militarization of public thinking and the way of life in the imperialist states where everything is being done to prepare, morally and psychologically, the population of the USA and the NATO countries for the idea that war is inevitable. The bourgeois propaganda machine is wiping out from people's minds ideas of peaceful coexistence and cooperation, of friendship among nations and the belief that the aggravated global problems of today can be solved through the joint effort of all states. Instead, it imposes on them the idea that precisely the stake on military force, the threat to use the military might or, if necessary, open military confrontation are a natural response to "Russia's challenge". Having lost any sense of responsibility, the bourgeois "experts" are trying to prove that war is not as horrible as it may seem, that its disastrous consequences are strongly exaggerated and that there can be a winner in a nuclear conflict.

The "Soviet threat" myth is a multi-purpose propaganda weapon of imperialism. In the capitalist world militarism and anti-Soviet hysteria are widely used for bolstering up the existing, and setting up new, alliances, blocs and groupings designed to smooth over as much as possible the interimperialist contradictions and rally the capitalist countries for the struggle against socialism.

The propaganda ballyhoo around a "Soviet threat" is also intended for discrediting the USSR's policy, splitting the national liberation movements and pitting against one another the main revolutionary currents of our time. Any development in the world that does not suit the USA is immediately labelled as "Moscow plotting" and "international terrorism". At the same time, the real purpose of these slanderous lies is to cover up the plans of US interference in the affairs of other states.

The escalation of fear is a tried and tested method of ideological brainwashing, of bending people to one's will and creating an atmosphere of total hysteria. John Foster Dulles, one of the fathers of the cold war, once said that to make a country bear the burden of armaments it is necessary to create an emotional atmosphere causing a sense of insecurity and fear of the future. People should believe, he said, that their country is faced with an outside threat. This recipe is readily used today by the US Administration and the leaders of a number of other NATO countries. The massive psychological "Soviet threat" campaign has worked, admitted Fred Charles Iklé, US Under-Secretary of Defence for Policy. This fear must be cultivated by all means to safeguard US interests in future. Iklé concluded, meaning the interests of the military-industrial complex, of course, which have nothing in common with the needs and aspirations of ordinary people in the world.

And, last but not least, the "Soviet threat" myth is used to hamstring the political and social rights of the working people. As they spread war hysteria, the financial oligarchy and military business bosses demand a redistribution of the national income in their own favour by cutting back on allocations for social needs. The General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA Gus Hall was quoted as saying that the anti-Soviet smokescreen is being used to convince Americans that they should reconcile themselves to new sacrifices in their lives, with the course for rigid economy, and to the new belt-tightening appeals, and at the same time to create the impression that anyone who is opposed to this attack on the people's living standards is taking an unpatriotic stand which runs counter to the national interests and the country's security.

The "Soviet threat" campaign harms the vital interests of the peoples, sowing fear and distrust, and contradicts the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. "The mass media," noted Leonid Brezhnev, "can and must tell the truth that the future of nations is closely associated with sound and reliable peace, with the establishment of the ideals of equality, social progress and freedom. To serve this truth is the noble duty and responsibility of journalists today."

The ideological struggle in the world is an objective fact. But the struggle of ideas has nothing to do with the psychological preparations for an exchange of nuclear strikes. The victory of one ideological concept over another has never been won on the battlefield.

The myth about a "Soviet threat", this Big Lie of the bourgeois propaganda, cannot be accepted by the majority of the world's population. Whatever the new cunning tricks the apologists of the dying capitalist system may resort to, the truth about the USSR's foreign policy of peace will find its way to people's hearts and minds. A policy is judged by deeds, not by words. And the declared Soviet obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons gives the lie to the "Soviet expansionism" fabrications.

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SOVIET EFFORTS FOR DISARMAMENT CONTRASTED WITH U.S. OBSTRUCTIONISM

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[Article by Y. Tomilin: "Curbing the Arms Race: The Key Problem of Our Time"]

[Text]

The struggle for disarmament is part and parcel of the USSR's effort to ensure peaceful conditions for the building of communist society. While viewing measures to limit arms and ensure disarmament as an important instrument in the struggle to consolidate peace, the USSR simultaneously seeks to release additional resources for peaceful constructive purposes. Proceeding from the policy-making decisions of the 24th, 25th and 26th Congresses of the CPSU, the Soviet Union is exploring every avenue in the search for a solution to the disarmament tasks set by these Congresses.

The task to curb the arms race, above all the nuclear arms race, has assumed particular urgency in recent years when the actions of the United States and its closest allies have sharply aggravated tensions in the world and increased the danger of nuclear war.

The 1960s and 1970s saw some positive results achieved in arms limitation: international agreements were signed on a ban on nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water, on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, on banning the emplacement of mass destruction weapons on the seabed, ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, on banning bacteriological and toxin weapons, on banning the use of environmental modification techniques; agreements were reached on limiting strategic arms and a number of confidence-building measures were initiated in Europe. Although the results achieved did not stop the arms race, they nevertheless had a salubrious effect on the international situation and showed that real measures in arms limitation were possible and feasible. What had been done provided a basis for further steps towards arms limitation and disarmament.

At the turn of the 1980s, however, the US policy swerved towards accelerated arms buildup and greater confrontation with the Soviet Union. These changes, which began under the Carter Administration, constituted the main thrust of the Reagan Administration.

The desire to achieve military superiority over the USSR, a feature of American policy throughout the postwar period, became the prevailing trend, one that leads to serious international complications and dramatically increases the threat of nuclear war.

In October 1981, the US President announced his new strategic programme for the 1980s which emphasizes the manufacture and deployment of new types of nuclear weapons that are far more accurate than the previous weapons and can reach the target much more quickly.

MX and Trident-2 ICBMs, Tomahawk cruise missiles, etc., figure prominently in that programme.

The Pentagon is advancing and promoting strategic conceptions of a "pre-emptive strike", "demonstration nuclear explosions" and "limited nuclear war" to "theoretically" justify the development of new types of nuclear weapons and to accustom public opinion in and outside the United States to the admissibility of the use of such weapons.¹

The history of the arm race throughout the postwar period has shown that the US attempts to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union are futile. Efforts in this direction cause retaliatory actions from the USSR whose aim is to ensure the defence capacity of the Soviet Union and its allies. Those who harbour plans of achieving military superiority clearly overrate their possibilities and overlook the possibilities of the other side which has not remained and will not remain passive in the face of military preparations directed against it. The present US attempts to attain military superiority over the Soviet Union are also doomed to failure.

At the same time, the result of the US arms buildup has been to increase the danger threatening a wide range of countries. Attempts to tip the military balance merely lead to a new spiral in the arms race, the danger of which lies in the fact that at a certain point in a particular spiral, the illusion of military superiority may appear. As a result, adventurist elements pushing the world towards nuclear war could become prevalent within the US leadership. And that would lead to a nuclear catastrophe that would destroy the whole world.

The actions of the United States pose a real danger for its allies. The emplacement of new American missiles on the territories of the NATO countries would make these countries hostages to the Pentagon's nuclear strategy. They would be exposed to a retaliatory strike which for most of them would be the last.

Finally, the US military plans present a real danger for the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. To the accompaniment of the propaganda ballyhoo about "eliminating the military lag behind the USSR" the USA is increasing its potential for waging so-called local wars in order to ensure the interests of American imperialism in various parts of the world. It is known that such wars mean in fact interference in the internal affairs of other states, support for reactionary puppet regimes and suppression of the national liberation movement.

Having committed itself to an intensive arms buildup, the United States has rejected almost all negotiations on arms limitation. In this context, the task of solving the problems of arms limitation, notably of nuclear arms limitation, and of averting the threat of nuclear war becomes of particular significance. These tasks were primarily posed by the delegations which had come to New York to attend the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (June 7-July 10, 1982). The Special Session was the biggest international

¹ For details see A. Slobodenko, "Banking on Mounting Tension", p. 91-98.

forum on disarmament in recent years, providing as it did wide opportunities for setting out and bringing to the knowledge of the international community the concrete Soviet proposals aimed at implementing the Peace Programme.

Central to the Session was the question of how to prevent nuclear war and to reduce its danger. Leonid Brezhnev's Message to the General Assembly declaring the unilateral Soviet commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons exerted a decisive influence on the entire course of the Session. The Soviet decision pointed out the most effective way to avert nuclear catastrophe. As the Message expressly indicated, this commitment became effective at the moment it was announced from the rostrum of the UN General Assembly on June 15, 1982. "The peoples of the world have the right to expect that the decision of the Soviet Union will be followed by reciprocal steps on the part of the other nuclear states," says the Message. If the other nuclear powers undertake an equally clear and unequivocal commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, that will amount to a ban on the use of nuclear weapons which is advocated by the majority of countries. The Soviet decision not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is a logical extension of the Soviet initiative at the 36th Session of the UN General Assembly resulting in the adoption of a resolution proclaiming first use of nuclear weapons to be the gravest crime against humanity.

Seeking to minimize the nuclear threat, the Soviet Union has come out for achieving a more radical goal, that of full elimination of nuclear weapons. As early as November 1977 it proposed to end the production of nuclear weapons and to reduce gradually their stocks with the prospect of their complete elimination. This proposal was subsequently elaborated into a comprehensive programme of nuclear disarmament envisaging talks between all nuclear powers. The programme includes the following measures:

- an end to the development of new systems of nuclear weapons;
- an end to the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of creating various types of nuclear weapons;
- an end to the production of nuclear warheads of every type and of the means of their delivery;
- gradual reduction of the existing stocks of nuclear weapons including means of delivery;
- complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

In search of measures to block the way to the arms race, many states and many political and public leaders in different countries have recently turned to the idea of freezing nuclear weapons, in other words, of stopping further buildup of nuclear potentials. Proposals on a nuclear freeze were made at the Second Special Session by India, Mexico, Sweden, Ireland and some other states.

The idea of a nuclear freeze is popular in the United States where it has following among influential circles and also on Capitol Hill.

Characteristically, all the proposals on a nuclear freeze view this not as an end in itself but as a starting points for the process of limiting, reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons. The Soviet delegation to the Session commenting on various proposals on a nuclear arms freeze noted that while they were not without contradictions they were generally headed in the right direction. "The idea of a mutual freeze of nuclear arsenals as a first step towards their reduction and, eventually, complete elimination is close to the Soviet point of view," said Leonid Brezhnev in his Message.

The Geneva Soviet-American talks on limiting nuclear weapons in Europe are the subject of close attention worldwide. These talks began in the autumn of 1980 and were resumed a year later, in the autumn of 1981. The fact of their resumption gave cause for satisfaction throughout the world, and especially in the European countries which hope that they will remove the tensions, deepen detente and confidence between nations and put Europe out of the nuclear danger which now threatens it. And indeed these talks are devoted to one of the key questions of European and international security.

The Soviet Union wants to see Europe completely free of medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons. It is ready for a partial solution of that task on the basis, say, of an agreement on complete renunciation of all types of medium-range nuclear weapons aimed at targets in Europe. Lastly, the Soviet Union will agree to gradual but substantial (by hundreds of units) reductions of nuclear medium-range weapons of both sides—the USSR and NATO.

The Soviet Union proves its commitment to ensuring the success of the Geneva talks by practical deeds. It has unilaterally halted the deployment of medium-range missiles in the European part of the USSR. Moreover, the Soviet Union is already reducing a substantial number of such weapons. It has stated in no uncertain terms that it will place no additional medium-range missiles within the striking distance of West European countries.

In its negotiating stand the Soviet Union proceeds from the assumption that limitations must be equal, that they must not impinge on the legitimate security interests of the two sides and must meet the task of curbing the nuclear arms race.

In keeping with this approach the Soviet Union proposes that the talks on nuclear arms limitations in Europe consider not only American medium-range missile systems deployed on the European continent but also the US forward-based nuclear weapons capable of reaching the territories of the USSR and its allies. The latter refers to nuclear weapon-carrying planes stationed on American air bases in some West European countries; nuclear weapon-carrying planes on board American aircraft carriers from which they could reach the territories of the USSR and its allies; American missile-carrying submarines under the NATO European command.

As the Soviet Defence Minister Marshal Ustinov said in a TASS interview published in *Pravda* on August 20, 1982, the Soviet Union in Geneva proposed a vast European zone of nuclear weapons cuts and limitation extending from the Arctic Ocean to Africa, from the mid-Atlantic to the Ural mountains. It also proposed that within this zone reductions of medium-range nuclear weapons (1,000 km and more but not intercontinental weapons) should be carried out in such a way as to leave the USSR and NATO with no more than 300 units of such weapons each, within 5 years after the agreement. All types of medium-range nuclear weapons, both missiles and planes, would be subject to cuts. The deployment of new types of nuclear weapons, including US Pershing-2 and cruise missiles, would be banned in the zone.

The Soviet proposals do not envisage any commitments for third countries. But the summary level of 300 medium-range weapons does include British and French aircraft and missiles. The Soviet Union cannot ignore the fact that these weapons are part of the NATO medium-range nuclear armaments targeted on the USSR and its allies.

The Soviet proposals also provide for some concomitant measures in Europe to limit nuclear weapons with a range of under 1,000 km. Such limitations of numerous armaments would undoubtedly serve the interests of all the European states. The USSR has also proposed that

medium-range nuclear weapons outside the European reduction and limitation zone be stationed in such a way as to be out of striking distance of targets on the territory of the other side within the said zone.

As far as the American stand at the talks on limiting nuclear arms in Europe is concerned, it can hardly be described as constructive. The USA continues to push the so-called zero option announced by the US President in his speech on November 18, 1981, which provided the basis for the American draft treaty proposed at the negotiations. The "zero option" basically requires that the Soviet Union unilaterally dismantle all its medium-range missiles both in the European part of the USSR and in its eastern regions, which have nothing to do with the problem of nuclear arms in Europe. This decision, if implemented, would give NATO a more than double advantage in the number of medium-range nuclear weapon carriers and a triple advantage in the number of nuclear warheads. In essence the American side appears to be saying: either the USSR unilaterally dismantles its medium-range missiles deployed as a counterweight to existing American forward-based nuclear weapons in Europe and the nuclear arms of the US allies (and also similar Soviet weapons emplaced in the Asian part of the USSR to protect its eastern and southern regions), or the United States deploys some 600 medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe in addition to those already in NATO's possession. In this case NATO would have 50 per cent more medium-range nuclear weapon carriers and almost twice as many warheads delivered by these carriers.

The US stand suggests that the American side needs the negotiations not for mutual reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe but, most likely, to lull public opinion in the West European countries which is protesting against the dangerous US military preparations and subsequently, by leading the negotiations into a deadlock, justify the deployment of almost 600 new American medium-range missiles in Western Europe beginning from 1983.

On June 29, 1982 the Soviet-American talks on strategic arms resumed in Geneva. It took the present US Administration a year and a half to agree to their resumption, not least due to the powerful anti-war movement in Western Europe and inside the United States.

The Soviet Union has always come out for substantial limitations of strategic weapons. But if an agreement is to be reached the two sides must pursue the negotiations taking into account the legitimate interests of each other and in keeping with the principle of equality and equal security; all the positive achievements in the SALT process must be preserved; the negotiations must genuinely pursue the aim of limiting and reducing strategic weapons and not serve as a smokescreen for building up arms and upsetting the existing parity; all the channels of strategic arms race in any form must be securely blocked. That means that the creation of new types of strategic weapons must be banned or limited as far as possible to agreed parameters.

Desirous of stemming the buildup of nuclear arsenals and facilitating progress towards radical limitation and reduction of strategic weapons, the Soviet Union proposed that with the start of the negotiations the USSR and the USA freeze the number of strategic weapons and reduce their modernization to a minimum. It also proposed that for the time of the negotiations the two sides refrain from any actions capable of upsetting the strategic balance.

What is the standpoint of the American side in the negotiations? Central to the American stand, as set out in Washington's official statements, is the insistence that at first there should be negotiations on submarine-launched ballistic missiles and ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and that particular attention should be paid to one type

of Soviet missiles—the SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles. As regards other strategic weapons—heavy bombers and cruise missiles—the United States proposes overlooking them. The US approach is prompted by the fact that the USA has an edge on the Soviet Union in nuclear-capable planes and cruise missiles. Thus, the US Administration is trying to use the talks to destabilize the balance of forces and alter it in its favour.

Needless to say, negotiations could not be fruitful on such a basis. They could only yield positive results if both sides seek to combine all the strategic means in such a way as to find a mutually acceptable equation that would ensure the legitimate security of both sides. If the American side agrees to such an approach then negotiations could get off the ground.

The general and complete ban of nuclear weapon tests is an important measure in the overall complex of measures to restrain the arms race and prevent the threat of nuclear war. Tests are a necessary and important element in the development of new types and systems of nuclear weapons and in their improvement. In addition, tests check the combat readiness of nuclear warheads under storage. If tests were suspended an important obstacle would be erected to the arms race. By the same token a ban on nuclear weapon tests would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, signed in Moscow in 1963, was useful in limiting nuclear weapons because it put a certain obstacle in the way of further upgrading nuclear weapons, especially of their more powerful types which are usually tested in the atmosphere. However, the Moscow Treaty virtually leaves out the underground nuclear tests. Besides, two nuclear powers, China and France, are not parties to the Moscow Treaty, a circumstance of no small importance.

That is why the task of banning nuclear weapon tests is a basic one in the matter of nuclear arms limitation. The question of a treaty on the complete and general ban of nuclear weapon tests has never been off the agenda of international forums dealing with disarmament. It is question number one on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, at the sessions of the UN General Assembly and of other international organizations.

In 1977, the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain began trilateral talks to conclude such a treaty. Substantial progress was achieved in the talks and the text of the future treaty was practically agreed. Only some technicalities remained to be sorted out. In August 1980, the participants of the trilateral talks presented a progress report to the Committee on Disarmament. It evoked highly positive response on the part of other states which viewed it as a promising sign of an early conclusion of the treaty.

However, the new US Administration, which won the November 1980 elections, declared that it needed time to study the question before resuming the trilateral talks. Having delayed the resumption of the talks for more than a year and a half under the pretext of "study", the White House announced to the world that the President has decided not to resume the Soviet-American-British talks on a complete and general ban of nuclear weapon tests which had been broken off by the United States. The American side declared that it considered such a treaty to be "untimely".

Even before the trilateral talks began, the USSR and the United States had signed two agreements—the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (1974), and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (1976). After delaying their ratification, the United States recently proclaimed its decision not to ratify them. The reasons for the US refusal to continue the trilateral talks and to ratify the 1974 and 1976 treaties were candidly explained by Eugene Rostow, Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who declared on May 13 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that given the need for a new weapons systems and modernization the USA is "going to need testing and perhaps even testing above the 150-kiloton limit for a long time to come".²

In spite of the US refusal to continue the trilateral talks, the struggle for a complete and general ban on nuclear weapon tests continues. The Soviet Union, other socialist countries and the non-aligned states are seeking, at the Committee on Disarmament, to start multilateral talks to conclude such a treaty. The US line to renounce the conclusion of a treaty on a complete and general ban on nuclear weapon tests is meeting with no support among many US allies.

An important task in restraining the nuclear arms race is, as before, an all-out effort to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. An increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons would make the outbreak of nuclear conflict more probable.

The nuclear non-proliferation regime is based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty which has been in effect since 1970. At present, 119 states have acceded to it and the Treaty has been an obstacle to the spread of nuclear weapons.

At the same time, as science and technology progress, the number of countries that have material and technological potential for creating nuclear weapons is growing. At the present stage, the growing demand for energy, rising prices for conventional fuels, and the construction of highly economical and safe nuclear power plants stimulate the development of atomic energy. It is an objective process justified in terms of human progress. Unless certain limits and conditions are imposed, that process inevitably leads to states developing nuclear energy acquiring materials, equipment and technology that could be used not only for peaceful purposes but also for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. These limits and conditions are part of the concept of non-proliferation. The stronger the non-proliferation regime the more solid the basis for broad international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Soviet Union invariably comes out for such cooperation and is active in it.

Non-nuclear states signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty are raising the question of safeguards for their security on the part of nuclear powers. The Soviet Union views this interest with understanding. It is proposing a solution through an international convention. Another possibility is the conclusion of bilateral agreements on safeguards with the states that do not possess nuclear weapons and do not have them on their territory.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty bans the acquisition or creation of nuclear weapons by the non-nuclear states. But it does not ban the emplacement of nuclear weapons on other states' territories. In order to close that channel, too, the Soviet Union proposes an international agreement to ban the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the territories of states where there are no such weapons at present. The proposal has been tabled at the Committee on Disarmament.

² A 150-kiloton ceiling was fixed by the 1974 Treaty

The establishment of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world plays an important role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. At present, there is one such zone, Latin America. Proposals have been made to create nuclear-free zones in Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, Northern Europe and a number of other regions. The Soviet Union takes a positive view of these initiatives. As a nuclear state it is prepared to contribute towards finding mutually acceptable solutions on nuclear-free zones.

In March 1978, the Soviet Union and the other socialist states submitted to the Committee on Disarmament a proposal on a convention to ban the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron weapons. The proposal takes on particular significance in the light of the US Administration's decision of August 6, 1981, to go ahead with the manufacture of the neutron bomb. However, talks on concluding a convention to ban the neutron weapon are being blocked by the Western powers.

Although nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to humanity, one should not underestimate the importance of measures to limit, reduce and eliminate other types of weapons, namely chemical, radiological and so on.

The question of banning and eliminating chemical weapons has been before international forums since 1969.

In 1976, the USSR and the USA began talks on prohibiting chemical weapons. Along with bilateral talks, the discussion of a ban on chemical weapons continued at the Committee on Disarmament. In 1980, the United States unilaterally broke off bilateral negotiations. Nevertheless, multilateral talks continued at the Committee on Disarmament. The United States and other Western countries are trying to slow them down in every way. They try to take advantage of the difficulties that arise over the problem of verification of a future convention. Wishing to achieve a breakthrough towards an international agreement to ban and eliminate chemical weapons, the Soviet Union submitted draft Basic Provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction to the Second Special Session. The draft takes into account the wishes of other states, including the control issue.

The question of control indeed involves a series of difficulties because the same chemical substances can be used both in weapons and for peaceful purposes. That is why many methods of control would interfere with normal functioning of peaceful chemical industries. Mindful of this, the Soviet Union believes that control over a chemical weapons ban should be based on national means. At the same time, it does not reject the possibility of some international procedures being used. On-the-spot inspections on a voluntary basis could be among such procedures. However, taking into account the considerations expressed by other states, the Soviet Union has agreed to propose the use of systematic on-the-spot checks, such as on the basis of an agreed quota, as one measure of monitoring the destruction of chemical weapons and the manufacture of highly toxic lethal chemicals for allowed purposes.

Beginning from 1975, the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament and other international forums has included the question put by the USSR of prohibiting the development and production of new types of mass destruction weapons and new systems of such weapons. The

Committee on Disarmament is currently the scene of negotiations to reach agreement on a treaty banning the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. The Soviet Union proposed renunciation of the use of new discoveries and achievements in science and technology for military purposes at the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament.

An important task arising from the rapid development of military technology is to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space. In 1981, at the 36th Session of the UN General Assembly the USSR proposed an agreement to ban the emplacement of any weapons in outer space. The Soviet Union submitted a draft treaty to the effect. The General Assembly approved the Soviet initiative and proposed that the Committee on Disarmament start negotiations on the issue. An item on preventing the arms race in outer space was included in the Committee's agenda despite opposition from the Western states.

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The Soviet Union comes out consistently for progress in all areas where opportunities open up for limiting and drastically reducing armaments, whether nuclear or other mass destruction weapons or conventional weapons. "There is no type of weapons which the Soviet Union would not be prepared to limit or ban on the basis of reciprocity," stressed the Message of Leonid Brezhnev to the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament. In this noble struggle the Soviet Union comes out together with other socialist countries and enjoys the support of the non-aligned states and world public at large.

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